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This paper was written is in response to the request by the International Labour Office to 
examine the link between macroeconomic policies, on the one hand, and growth and 
employment outcomes, on the other hand, of a large sample of developing and emerging 
economies. It is part of the overall project on ‘Growth and Productive Employment in 
Development Countries – Outcomes and Policies’.  
The macroeconomic policies that this paper has examined cover fiscal policies, monetary 
policies, financial policies and exchange rate policies. Also included have been policies 
related to investment in development.  
Data were gathered for 145 developing and emerging economies. These countries were 
clustered into three income groups for analytical purposes: 1) Emerging Economies, 2) 
Lower-Middle Income Countries and 3) Least Developed Countries. Our analysis also 
included three cross-cutting groups, which included heavily indebted countries, transition 
economies and major oil and gas exporters. 
Data were gathered for the following periods, in accordance with instructions from the 
ILO: the 1980s, the 1990s and the 2000s (up through 2011). Also included were the sub-
periods of 2000-2007 and 2008-2013 (before and after the Global Financial Crisis). Data 
for 2013 were estimates and, in some cases, this was also true of data for 2012. 
The initial effort for this consultancy was to amass, for the above time periods, a data 
bank of ‘macroeconomic outcomes’. The indicators for these outcomes are described in 
the next section. Of particular concern to the ILO is the issue of ‘fiscal space’, namely, 
whether countries have the resources necessary to accelerate economic growth and 
expand productive employment.  
I. The Selection of Indicators 
The following indicators have been selected for the four main macroeconomic policy 
areas (fiscal policy, monetary policy, financial policy and exchange rate policy) as well 
as the supplementary area of development policy. The selection of indicators has been 
guided by the research focus on outcomes and policies as well as data availability.  
There were problems, for example, with the availability of representative data for these 
indicators for the 1980s. Hence, this paper’s analysis focuses on the 1990s and the 2000s 
and the transition between these two periods. Our methodological approach was to 
exclude decadel averages for countries when there were less than four data points. As a 
supplement, the paper also examines the differences in these indicators between the 
period 2000-2007 and the period 2008-2013. The data on the 1980s can be made readily 
available upon request. 
 3 
Following are the four areas of macroeconomic policy, the indicators selected for each 
area, and the data source. The criteria for choosing each indicator included not only their 
usefulness but also the availability of data across a large sample of countries. 
1. Fiscal Policy 
 
a. General government net lending/borrowing as % of GDP, i.e. the fiscal 
balance: available from the IMF (WEO) database. 
b. General government revenue (including grants) as % of GDP: available from 
the IMF (WEO) database. (Because of its inclusion of grants, this indicator 
was supplemented with the indicator ‘official development assistance as a 
ratio to gross national income’). 
c. General government gross debt as % of GDP: available from the IMF (WEO) 
database.   
 
2. Monetary Policy 
 
a. Inflation rate (average consumer price inflation) in %: available from the IMF 
(WEO) database. 
b. Broad money growth (annual % growth in money and quasi-money): available 
from the World Bank database. 
c. Real interest rates (lending rate adjusted by GDP deflator): available from the 
World Bank database. 
 
3. Financial Policy 
 
a. Domestic credit by banking sector as % of GDP: available from the World 
Bank database. 
b. Total external debt as % of GNI: available from the World Bank database. 
c. Short-term debt as % of total external debt: available from the World Bank 
database.  
 
4. Exchange Rate Policy 
 
a. Trade balance as % of GDP: available from the UNCTAD database. 
b. Current account balance as % of GDP: available from the IMF (WEO) 
database. 
c. International reserves as % of GDP: available from the IMF (IFS) database. 
 
5. Development Policy 
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Additionally, three outcome indicators related to Development Policy were included as 
supplementary sources of information. The emphasis was on indicators related to 
domestic investment and social and economic infrastructure:  
a. Gross capital formation as % of GDP: available from the World Bank 
database. 
b. Gross secondary school enrolment as % of the total population of official 
secondary education age: available from the World Bank database. 
c. Electrical power consumption expressed as kWh per capita: available from 
the World Bank database. 
In the following section, we extensively review macroeconomic outcomes (based on the 
above indicators) clustered primarily by the three income groups, i.e., Emerging 
Economies, Lower-Middle Income Countries and Least Developed Countries. The main 
focus is on the 1990s and 2000s. There is a secondary focus on the differing trends for the 
period 2000-2007 and the period 2008-2013. 
Also analyzed were differences in macroeconomic outcomes among three ‘cross-cutting’ 
groups. These groups are represented across the three income groups. These ‘cross-
cutting’ groups are 1) heavily indebted countries, 2) transition economies, and 3) major 
oil and gas exporters. Heavily indebted countries were defined as countries with external 
debt of at least 60% of GNI. Major oil and gas exporters were defined as countries with 
export revenue from oil and/or gas that exceeded half of all their export revenue. 
All data on macroeconomic outcomes are expressed as unweighted averages. The 
rationale for this choice is that we are interested primarily in country-by-country 
performance. When weighted averages are used, those economies with larger economies 
have a more decisive influence on the overall average.
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II. A Review of Macroeconomic Outcomes across 
Groups 
This section starts its analysis with differences in growth rates of GDP across the three 
major income groups. 
A. GDP Growth 
1. EEs, LMIs and LDCs 
Over the past three decades developing and emerging economies have managed to 
accelerate their growth rates significantly. This development prompted a debate about 
whether the economic prospects of the developing world were being ‘decoupled’ from 
advanced economies, where growth was slowing significantly as a result of widespread 
austerity measures.  
This debate was particularly intense in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis when it 
appeared that the developing world – led, for example, by Chinese economic growth and 
strong international demand for primary commodities – would provide the impetus for a 
global recovery.
1
 More recently, of course, this enthusiasm has waned since some of the 
major emerging economies have begun to face difficulties as a result of a return flow of 
capital to the advanced economies.
2
  
Nevertheless, over the course of roughly the last two decades, developing and emerging 
economies as a whole have experienced an upsurge in their growth of GDP. Table 1 
shows that the average growth of all such countries rose from 3% in the 1990s to 4.7% in 
the 2000s. At the same time, the record before the Global Financial Crisis (2000-2007) 
and the record afterwards (2008 to 2013
3
) have been noticeably different. During the pre-
crisis period, the average growth of GDP for all such countries was 5.2% whereas during 
the post-crisis period, it had slowed down to 4%. 
What has been encouraging is that the Least Developed Countries grew the fastest in both 
the 1990s and 2000s (namely, at 3.7% and 5.2%, respectively). And they were still 
growing the fastest during the post-crisis period (2008-2013), i.e., at a 4.6% rate.  
The country grouping with the highest income per capita, the Emerging Economies, were 
also growing fairly rapidly during 2000-2007 (i.e., at 5.3%) but they slumped noticeably 
to only 3.3% during 2008-2013. In other words, the Emerging Economies were losing 
their new status as an engine of global growth. 
                                                 
1
 See IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2008. 
2
 See IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2013. 
3
 Growth rates for 2013 are IMF estimates. When reference is made to the 2000s, this period includes 2000-
2011. For the period 2008-2013, some data for 2012 can also be estimates. 
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The Lower Middle Income grouping grew relatively slowly during the 1990s, at only 
2.5%, but accelerated to an average rate of 4.5% during the 2000s. However, during the 
post-crisis period of 2008-2013, their average growth slowed slightly to 4.2%.  
 
2. Heavily Indebted, Transition and Oil/Gas Exporting Countries 
Our analysis of economic growth, employment generation and macroeconomic outcomes 
also covers three cross-cutting groupings of countries: heavily indebted countries, 
transition economies and prominent exporters of oil and gas (for which such commodities 
comprise more than half of export earnings). This research has identified Heavily 
Indebted countries as those with external debt that represents 60% or more of GDP. In 
total there are 55 heavily indebted countries in our sample: 12 EEs, 17 LMIs and 26 
LDCs. This threshold would apply to countries such as Argentina and Brazil (both of 
them EEs), Egypt, Ghana, Kyrgyz Republic and Pakistan (LMIs) and countries such as 
Lao PDR, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Rwanda and Uganda (LDCs).  Such 
heavily indebted countries are spread across the three incomes groups, EEs, LMIs and 
LDCs, but are disproportionately found among LDCs and LMIs. 
There was a sharp acceleration of growth across the three cross-cutting groupings 
between the 1990s and 2000s (see Table 1). But the most pronounced change occurred in 
the transition economies. This group includes economies such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Mongolia, Romania, Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The majority of transition 
economies are concentrated among EEs (14) and a minority among LMIs (10).  
Collectively, transition economies experienced an average decline of -1.4% in GDP 
growth during the 1990s, which was the most difficult period of their transition to a more 
market-based economy. However, by the 2000s they had bounced back dramatically to 
average a growth rate of GDP of 6%. This turn-around had a pronounced impact on the 
growth record of Emerging Economies as a whole and, to a lesser extent, on the growth 
record of Lower-Middle Income Countries. 
The countries specializing in the export of oil and gas include Angola, Algeria, 
Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Sudan and Venezuela. Half of them are Emerging Economies (10 
countries) and about one third are LDCs (7 countries). There are fewer LMIs in this 
group (5 countries). 
Oil and gas exporting countries did only moderately well during the 1990s (when demand 
for such commodities was subdued): they grew by the slightly above-average rate of 
3.5%. But by the 2000s their economies were booming, averaging 7.1% overall, and 
almost 9% during 2000-2007. However, by 2008-2013, in the wake of the global crisis, 
their growth rate was back down to 4.3%. 
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Perhaps surprisingly, heavily indebted countries also experienced an increase in 
economic growth between the 1990s and 2000s. However, this increase was still 
relatively moderate, namely, from 3.2% to 4.3%. But in the wake of the global crisis, 
during 2008-2013, their growth only slowed down back to 4.1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Average Annual Growth Rates for Income Groups and Cross-Cutting Groups 
GDP
Growth	rates
EEs
LMIs
LDCs
High	debt	countries
Transition	economies
Oil	&	gas	exporters
1990s 2000s 2000-07 2008-13
3.0 4.7 5.2 4.0
2.8 4.5 5.3 3.3
2.5 4.5 4.9 4.2
3.7 5.2 5.4 4.6
3.2 4.3 4.4 4.1
-1.4 6.0 7.4 3.3
3.5 7.1 8.9 4.3  
Source: IMF data. 
Nevertheless, despite the relative slowdowns in GDP growth after 2007 in the three major 
income groups of EEs, LMIs and LDCs, as well as among the groupings of Indebted, 
Transition and Oil & Gas Exporting Countries, one might still reasonably expect that 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the historical upsurge in economic growth would have 
led to some significant gains in employment. The following section examines the extent 
to which this was the case. 
B. Employment Outcomes 
Our analysis relies on three sets of employment indicators, as explained earlier in Section 
X. The first employment indicator is the share of wage (and salary) employment in total 
employment. Wage employment is considered to be a rough proxy for quality 
employment. The second employment indicator is the share of vulnerable employment in 
total employment. Since vulnerable employment is not desirable, a positive employment 
outcome would be a decline in the share of those vulnerably employed. 
Progress in expanding quality employment between the 1990s and 2000s was not 
significant if changes in the two above indicators are used as the main barometers. For 
example, on average, there was a 2.5 percentage point gain in wage employment during 
this period across all three income groups (EEs, LMIs and LDCs) (see Table 2). Across 
the three groups, the results varied only between a 2.2 percentage point average gain (for 
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the Lower-Middle Income countries) and a 2.7 percentage point average gain (for the 
Emerging Economies). 
The results for vulnerable employment were similar. On average, among all three income 
groups, there was a -2.7 percentage point change in vulnerable employment between the 
1990s and 2000s. The results across the three groupings varied only between -3.0 
percentage points (for the Emerging Economies) and -2.4 (for the Lower-Middle Income 
countries). 
Given these modest results, our analysis attempted to delve more deeply into changes in 
employment by utilizing a new ILO data set (see Kapsos and Bourmpoula 2013) on the 
absolute levels of labour incomes of the employed, expressed in PPP terms (or 
international US dollars).  
Table 2. Wage and Vulnerable Employment for Income Groups  
Country	group
Average
EE
LMI
LDC
1990s 2000s Change 1990s 2000s Change
41.8 44.2 2.5 55.7 53.1 -2.7
63.3 66.0 2.7 33.2 30.2 -3.0
43.1 45.3 2.2 54.2 51.8 -2.4
18.0 20.5 2.5 80.9 78.2 -2.6
Wage	employment Vulnerable	employment
 
Source: ILO data. 
As explained earlier, this data set disaggregates the employed into five categories: 1) 
those earning labour incomes below $1.25 per day (namely, the extremely poor); 2) those 
earning labour incomes below $2.00 per day (namely, the moderately poor); 3) those 
earning labour incomes between $2.00 and $4.00 per day (the ‘near-poor’); 4) those 
earning labour incomes between $4.00 and $13.00 per day (the ‘developing middle 
class’); and 5) those earning labour incomes above $13.00 per day (the ‘established 
middle class and above’).  
Our analysis first gauges the change in the size of the combined share of the top three 
groups between the 1990s and 2000s. In other words, this combination lumps together all 
three of the non-poor groups and excludes the two poor groups (the extremely poor and 
moderately poor). On this basis, there was a 8.5 percentage-point increase in the size of 
the combined non-poor group for the Lower-Middle Income countries (see Table 3). 
Among the LDCs, there was a 7.6 percentage point increase. However, among the 
Emerging Economies, there was only a 5.5 percentage point increase. 
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Table 3. Labour Incomes of the Employed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kapsos and Bourmpoula 2013 
 
However, such a comparison is not likely to be reflective of meaningful changes in 
employment in the Lower-Middle Income countries and especially among the Emerging 
Economies since their two poor groupings are likely to be small and there might even be 
desirable declines in the size of the ‘near-poor’. Such a decline would tend to diminish 
the gains among the three non-poor groups. Given these caveats, our analysis delved 
more deeply into the results for both the LMIs and EEs. 
Indeed, among the Emerging Economies there was, on average, a 4.2 percentage point 
increase in the size of the combined grouping of the employed who were at least 
‘developing middle class’ (i.e., had labour incomes above $4 per day). This threshold 
would also include the ‘established middle class and above’, namely, those who earned 
above $13 per day). This result implies that the EE’s ‘near-poor’ grouping contracted, in 
fact, by almost 2 percentage points. 
The EE’s significant results for the ‘developing middle class and above’ contrasts with 
the much more modest corresponding 2.4 percentage point gain among LDCs. This latter 
result confirms that there was, in fact, a much bigger 4.9 percentage point gain in the size 
of the ‘near-poor’ employed in LDCs. This finding qualifies the achievement of the 
LDCs in generating more widespread quality employment.  
Among Lower-Middle Income countries, there was a 5 percentage point increase in the 
employed that were at least ‘developing middle class’ (earning more than $4 per day). 
Country	group 1990s 2000s Change
Average 54.0 61.2 7.2
EE 84.1 89.7 5.5
LMI 56.5 65.0 8.5
LDC 23.1 30.7 7.6
Average 22.1 24.2 2.1
EE 23.6 21.6 -1.9
LMI 27.4 30.6 3.2
LDC 15.6 20.5 4.9
Average 25.3 29.1 3.8
EE 46.8 51.1 4.2
LMI 23.8 28.8 5.0
LDC 6.2 8.5 2.4
Average 6.6 7.8 1.2
EE 13.8 17.0 3.2
LMI 4.8 5.1 0.3
LDC 1.5 1.7 0.3
Developing	
middle	class	
(4-13	US$,	
PPP)
Middle	class	
and	above	
(13+	US$,	PPP)
All	non-poor	
(2-13+	US$,	
PPP)
Near	poor	(2-4	
US$,	PPP)
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This outcome implies that there was a 3.2 percentage point increase in the size of the 
‘near-poor’ employed. 
Lastly, our analysis focused on expansions in the employed who earned more than $13 
per day (i.e., earned incomes above the equivalent of the US poverty line). Only the 
Emerging Economies registered a significant expansion in this grouping of the employed, 
i.e., a 3.2 percentage increase between the 1990s and 2000s.  
Hence, the Emerging Economies registered a 2 percentage point decline in the share of 
the ‘near-poor’ employed (those earning $2 to $4 per day) and a 4 percentage point 
increase in the share of the employed who were ‘developing middle class’ (those earning 
$4 to $13 per day). But the Emerging Economies registered a 3.2 percentage point 
increase in the share of the employed who were ‘established middle class or above’ 
(earned $13 per day or more). 
After this review of outcomes for the growth of GDP and expansion of employment, this 
paper reviews the data for ‘macroeconomic outcomes’ related to fiscal policies, monetary 
policies, financial policies and exchange-rate policies. And it supplements this 
information with data on ‘development outcomes’, such as investment in social and 
economic infrastructure. 
C.  Macroeconomic Outcomes  
1. Fiscal Policies 
A country’s ‘fiscal space’, namely, its ability to finance development efforts, is greatly 
influenced by the revenue of its central government. While in some large economies, the 
revenue of provincial and local governments can be an important source of financing, the 
comparative data in this analysis are limited to the central government.  
Generally, emerging and developing economies achieved, on average, significant 
increases in government revenue between the 1990s and 2000s. The average across all 
three groups rose from 22.8% during the 1990s to 26% during the 2000s (Table 4). But 
during the period 2008-2013, the overall average rose to 27.6%. The average for each of 
the three groupings, EEs, LMIs and LDCs, rose in similar fashion, by about 3-4 
percentage points, between the 1990s and 2000s. There were also are similar trend 
increases in revenue across the three groups between the period 2000-2007 and 2008-
2013. 
What is noteworthy is that the Emerging Economies have not achieved markedly higher 
average revenue levels than either the LMIs or LDCs. The EEs had achieved a revenue 
level that was about 29% of GDP during the 2000s while the LMIs had achieved about 
25% and the LDCs 23.5%.  
Of course, as the data in Table 2 suggest, these overall results have been boosted by the 
revenue levels achieved by both transition economies and oil and gas exporters 
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(especially the latter). The results for transition economies would have improved the 
progress of EEs and LMIs while the results for oil and gas exporting countries would 
have disproportionately improved the prospects of EEs in particular and, to a lesser extent, 
LDCs. 
Table 4. Average General Government Revenue for Income Groups and Cross-Cutting 
Groups 
FISCAL	POLICY
General	government	revenue	as	%	of	GDP
EEs
LMIs
LDCs
High	debt	countries
Transition	economies
Oil	&	gas	exporters
1990s 2000s 2000-07 2008-13
22.8 26.0 25.3 27.6
25.4 29.2 28.7 30.1
22.2 25.2 24.6 26.3
21.0 23.5 22.2 26.0
23.0 25.0 24.4 26.0
26.5 32.0 31.0 34.0
23.6 33.6 32.4 35.7  
Source: World Bank data. 
Our data set also allows us to compare the contribution of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) to the revenue levels across the three major groupings of countries. As 
Graph 1 suggests, ODA remained very significant in LDCs during the 2000s. It 
corresponded to almost 16% of Gross National Income. And for the Lower-Middle 
Income countries, ODA still represented almost 5% of GNI during the same period. Such 
grants boosted the average level of government revenue for these two income groups. 
Many of the LDCs and some LMIs also benefitted from debt relief, principally during the 
2000s.  This benefit was conferred by the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
initiative, supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
Generally, gross government debt declined significantly across developing and emerging 
economies over the 1990s and 2000s, but particularly during the late 2000s.  
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Graph 1. Average General Government Revenue relative to ODA for Income Groups 
during the 2000s 
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Source: World Bank data. 
 
This trend has persisted despite the recent adversities imposed by the Global Financial 
Crisis and the subsequent slowdown in international trade and financial activity. Hence, 
during the period 2008 to 2013 all three income groups – EEs, LMIs and LDCs – had 
reduced their debt levels well below 60% of GDP on average (Table 5). The most 
dramatic decline was among LDCs because of the benefits of debt relief. But transition 
economies and oil and gas exporters had fared even better, achieving debt to GDP ratios 
below 30% during this same period.       
Table 5. Average General Government Debt for Income Groups and Cross-Cutting Groups     
FISCAL	POLICY
General	government	debt
EEs
LMIs
LDCs
High	debt	countries
Transition	economies
Oil	&	gas	exporters
1990s 2000s 2000-07 2008-13
73.7 63.8 73.4 45.4
53.1 47.0 49.9 41.2
80.1 60.4 68.7 45.3
100.3 86.3 104.8 50.5
105.2 101.1 118.9 67.2
63.8 35.3 38.2 28.9
122.7 43.9 55.9 24.0  
Source: IMF data. 
All three country groups were also able to reduce their fiscal deficits between the 1990s 
and 2000s. Fiscal deficits for Emerging Economies declined only from -2.3% to -1.6%. 
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These levels of deficits compared favourably to those for both LMIs and LDCs (Graph 2). 
Moreover, such modest resultant deficits need not be problematic, especially if there are 
viable sources of domestic revenue that grow with income levels. 
On average, Lower-Middle Income countries were able to reduce their fiscal deficits 
from -3.8% of GDP during the 1990s to -2.1% during the 2000s. LDCs were able to 
reduce even further their average fiscal deficits, namely, from -3.8% to -1.5%. However, 
among all three income groups, fiscal deficits began to widen again during 2008-2013.   
Nevertheless, it is important to note that there was substantial fiscal tightening in these 
countries between the 1990s and 2000s. And this tightening would have counteracted, in 
effect, the expansion in their revenue base. So, fiscal policies are not likely to have 
played a leading role in generating increases in economic growth in these countries. 
Not included in Graph 2 are trends among heavily indebted countries, transition 
economies and oil and gas exporting countries. Strikingly, heavily indebted countries 
were also able to reduce their average fiscal deficit. Between the 1990s and the 2000s, 
this group’s deficit declined from -4.1% of GDP to -3.4%. However, there were much 
more dramatic declines in fiscal deficits among both transition economies and oil & gas 
exporting countries.  
Transition economies reduced their average fiscal deficit from a relatively high -6.6% of 
GDP during the 1990s all the way down to -1.1% during the 2000s (though this deficit 
rose slightly during the period 2008-2013). This trend would have had a pronounced 
effect on the fiscal tightening of both Emerging Economies and Lower-Middle Income 
Countries. 
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Graph 2. Average Fiscal Balance for Income Groups  
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Source: IMF data. 
 
Between the 1990s and 2000s, the oil and gas exporting countries made impressive gains 
on their fiscal balances, no doubt based on the rising international prices of their exports. 
During the 1990s, this grouping was running an average fiscal deficit of -2.9%. But 
during the 2000s, it was boasting an average fiscal surplus of 4.3% of GDP! This 
turnaround in fiscal outcomes would have mostly benefitted the outcomes for Emerging 
Economies and Least Developed Countries. 
 
2. Monetary Policies  
The rates of consumer price inflation and broad money growth were both reduced 
dramatically between the 1990s and 2000s across emerging and developing countries (see 
Table 6). The average rate of inflation was well over 100% during the 1990s across 
Emerging Economies, Lower-Middle Income Countries and Least Developed Countries.  
There were particularly high inflation rates in Latin American countries, such as 
Argentina and Brazil, and among some African economies, such as Angola and the 
Central Republic of Congo. Across all transition economies inflation averaged about 
370% during the 1990s and across all oil and gas exporting countries it averaged over 
200%. 
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Table 6. Average Consumer Price Inflation and Broad Money Growth for Income Groups 
and Cross-Cutting Groups     
MONETARY	POLICY
Inflation
EEs
LMIs
LDCs
High	debt	countries
Transition	economies
Oil	&	gas	exporters
1990s 2000s 2000-07 2008-13
123.7 8.7 9.2 8.1
127.6 7.8 8.2 7.1
118.0 7.4 7.1 8.5
124.7 11.0 12.1 8.9
119.4 9.3 9.6 9.2
369.6 10.5 11.6 8.3
204.5 12.3 14.6 9.3
Broad	money	growth
EEs
LMIs
LDCs
High	debt	countries
Transition	economies
Oil	&	gas	exporters
86.5 19.5 21.6 15.2
77.0 18.6 22.4 12.2
63.6 18.3 19.8 13.8
117.6 21.5 22.4 19.8
114.3 18.8 18.8 17.0
123.5 28.6 36.6 14.1
135.1 28.6 33.3 20.9  
Source: IMF data. 
In stark contrast, however, during the 2000s inflation had plummeted to an average of 
only 7-11% across the EEs, LMIs and LDCs. In other words, there was a general 
tendency of monetary tightening during the late 1990s and 2000s. This was necessary, to 
some degree, in view of the problem of high inflation in the 1990s. However, a continued 
pursuit of such tightening, especially during the late 2000s, could have contributed to 
slowing economic growth. 
Inflation trends were somewhat different across the income groups and cross-cutting 
groups. For example, the average inflation rate remained above 10% among the LDCs 
during the early 2000s but it dropped below 9% on average during 2008-2013. But 
among heavily indebted countries, average inflation still persisted at levels over 9% 
throughout the period 2000-2013. 
The trend in the growth of broad money or M2 moved broadly in line with that for the 
inflation rate. On average, across all countries, the rate of growth of broad money was 
about 87% during the 1990s but dropped to a little under 20% during the 2000s.  
The growth of broad money was above 100% during the 1990s among LDCs and heavily 
indebted countries. Broad money growth was also above this threshold for both transition 
economies and oil and gas exporting countries. But by the 2000s, such growth was, on 
average, down roughly to about 20-25% across LDCs and the three cross-cutting groups.  
During the 2000s, the rate of growth of broad money was running well ahead of the 
inflation rate across the Emerging Economies, Lower-Middle Income Countries and 
Least Developed Countries, as well as across the three cross-cutting groups of heavily 
indebted countries, transition economies and oil and gas exporting countries. 
While inflation became more subdued in the 2000s, on average, across all emerging and 
developing countries, the real interest rate remained high in some groupings, particularly 
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among LDCs and heavily indebted countries. For example, the real interest rate still 
averaged close to 10% for the LDCs across both 2000-2007 and 2008-2013 (Table 7). In 
heavily indebted countries, the real rate of interest rose to over 14% during 2000-2007 
though it declined back to about 9% during 2008-2013. Nevertheless, these relatively 
high levels of the real interest rate represented a major stumbling block to increasing 
productive investment and economic growth. 
In fact, only the Emerging Economies managed to reduce their average real rate of 
interest to below 6% during 2008-2013. Oil and gas exporting economies were successful 
in reducing their real rate of interest to about 2%--primarily because of negative real rates 
of interest among a number of countries, such as Iraq, Libya and Angola, during 2000-
2007. But group average jumped back up to about 8% during 2008-2013. 
Hence, while inflation became more subdued during the 2000s, especially in the wake of 
the slowdown in the late 2000s induced by the Global Financial Crisis, real rates of 
interest remained relatively high in some of the less developed economies. These rates 
suggest that domestic financial systems in these countries were not able to provide 
adequate financing for economic growth and development. 
Table 7. Real Interest Rates for Income Groups and Cross-Cutting Groups     
MONETARY	POLICY
Real	interest	rates
EEs
LMIs
LDCs
High	debt	countries
Transition	economies
Oil	&	gas	exporters
1990s 2000s 2000-07 2008-13
7.7 9.4 9.7 7.4
8.2 5.8 5.9 5.8
10.1 13.6 14.0 7.0
4.3 9.6 9.9 9.9
7.6 14.4 14.8 8.9
8.2 6.3 6.1 6.7
7.0 3.4 2.1 8.1  
Source: World Bank data. 
 
3. Financial Policies  
Although there has been some recent optimism about financial deepening in emerging 
and developing countries, especially in countries in sub-Saharan Africa where domestic 
credit was reported to have been expanded (Griffith-Jones 2013), our data suggest that 
the extension of domestic credit by banks in such countries has remained relatively 
modest. 
The trends in domestic credit as a ratio to GDP confirm that there was little relative 
increase in domestic credit from the 1990s to the 2000s in either Lower-Middle Income 
Countries or Least Developed Countries. This represents a major macroeconomic 
problem because it suggests that financial institutions in these countries are not offering 
adequate levels of lending to sustain private (or public) investment. 
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In LMIs domestic credit remained basically flat, at about 40% of GDP, between the 
1990s and 2000s, edging up above 40% only during 2008-2013 (see Table 8). In LDCs, 
the ratio of domestic credit to GDP rose only, on average, by a little over 2 percentage 
points during the 2000s in comparison to this grouping’s relatively low level of under 
22% during the 1990s. By 2008-2013 this average had only slightly exceeded 26%. 
In Emerging Economies there was a more significant boost to domestic credit between 
the 1990s and 2000s. For example, compared to the average of about 51% during the 
1990s, domestic credit as a ratio to GDP rose to over 62% during 2008-2013. Transition 
Economies also enjoyed a significant boost in domestic credit. Whereas their domestic 
credit was only about 29% of GDP during the 1990s (the most difficult period of their 
‘transition’), it had begun rising sharply during 2008-2013 to reach an average of a little 
over 50%. Since transition economies are disproportionately included within Emerging 
Economies, the trends in domestic credit in these two groupings are related. 
In contrast, the trend in the expansion of domestic credit in oil and gas exporting 
countries was negative: measured as a ratio to GDP, domestic credit dropped from 29% 
during the 1990s to almost 10% during the 2000s. The explanation is that in some 
countries, such as Libya, Equatorial Guinea and Algeria, banks extended less credit than 
the government deposits held in their accounts. 
Table 8. Domestic Credit by Banks as Share of GDP for Income Groups and Cross-Cutting 
Groups     
FINANCIAL	POLICY
Domestic	credit
EEs
LMIs
LDCs
High	debt	countries
Transition	economies
Oil	&	gas	exporters
1990s 2000s 2000-07 2008-13
38.1 40.8 38.9 45.3
50.9 56.4 53.6 62.3
40.0 40.3 38.2 45.6
21.6 24.4 23.6 26.2
42.1 44.7 44.9 45.7
28.6 32.9 26.2 50.2
29.0 10.8 10.8 9.5  
Source: World Bank data. 
Concerns about the destabilizing impact of credit expansion on domestic economies, 
particularly since 2008, have been raised with regard to a number of Emerging 
Economies. While economic theory has traditionally assumed a positive link between 
financial depth and long-term growth (Levine 2005), serious doubts began to emerge 
about excessive ‘financialisation’ long before the Global Financial Crisis (Minsky 1986; 
Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz 2000).  
When domestic credit reaches the range of 80-100% of GDP, a systematic negative 
impact on economic growth appears to emerge (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012). Our data 
show that in a number of emerging economies (such as China, Lebanon, Malaysia, South 
Africa and Thailand), credit expansion expanded well beyond 100% of GDP during the 
2000s.  
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Table 9. External Debt as Share of GNI and the Share of Short-Term Debt in Total 
External Debt for Income Groups 
FINANCIAL	POLICY
External	debt	stock
EEs
LMIs
LDCs
1990s 2000s 2000-07 2008-13
81.6 62.7 71.8 44.4
45.5 48.3 49.0 46.4
93.3 56.2 61.9 41.5
109.8 84.3 105.3 44.8
Short-term	debt
EEs
LMIs
LDCs
12.1 13.6 12.9 14.5
18.0 20.6 19.6 22.3
10.7 11.8 10.7 12.9
7.4 7.8 7.9 7.7  
Source: World Bank. 
The size of a country’s external debt stock can become a matter of great concern since it 
can subject domestic policymaking to severe external constraints. The record of 
developing and emerging economies in reducing their external debt stocks has been 
mixed. For example, the external debt stock of Emerging Economies did not improve 
between the 1990s and 2000s. In fact, it rose slightly, from about 45% of GDP to 48% 
(Table 9). The debt stock of transition economies rose sharply, in fact, between these two 
periods: from 37% of GDP to almost 57%, an average level that could easily become 
fiscally unsustainable. 
Least Developed Countries did manage to reduce their external debt between the 1990s 
and the 2000s, from about 110% of GDP to about 84%. However, the most dramatic 
reduction in their external debt occurred in the late 2000s as a result of a concerted 
international debt relief program that began to have an effect by the mid 2000s. 
Only Lower-Middle Income countries succeeded in substantially reducing their external 
debt, from about 93% of GDP to 56% between the 1990s and 2000s. Nevertheless, even 
in LMIs (where debt was still close to 60%), and certainly also among the other two 
major income groups, levels of external debt have remained relatively high on average 
and/or have not been substantially reduced. 
In addition to the size of a country’s external debt, the share of this debt that is short-term 
in nature has become a major concern internationally. Such debt has the potential to 
create greater financial instability, especially in the Emerging Economies, which have 
become temporary havens for portfolio investments seeking out the highest international 
rates of return. 
Since short-term inflows of capital are likely to be channelled into speculative activity 
(Lin, 2011), a significant number of Emerging Economies – most prominently Brazil and 
Chile – have recently instituted capital-account regulation to help stabilize the impact of 
such flows on their capital accounts. This problem was intensified in the aftermath of the 
Global Financial Crisis, as liquidity began to flood out of advanced economies, where 
expansionary (and unconventional) monetary policies lowered the rates of return to 
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speculative investment, and crowd into emerging economies where the currency-adjusted 
short-term rates of return were the highest.  
Unfortunately, such an inflow of capital has a tendency to appreciate the recipient 
country’s real exchange rate, jeopardizing its export success. This effect then leaves such 
an economy vulnerable to a sudden depreciation in its real exchange rate, which can 
trigger a rapid outflow of speculative capital. 
According to available data, short-term debt was on the rise in Emerging Economies 
between the 1990s and 2000s. The share of short-term debt in total external debt rose in 
these economies from 18% in the 1990s to almost 20% during 2000-2007 and then to 
over 22% during 2008-2013 (though this effect began to abate in late 2013). 
The situation was less serious, on average, in Lower-Middle Income Countries. Among 
LMIs short-term debt, as a ratio to total external debt, did rise from almost 11% during 
the 1990s to about 13% during 2008-2013. But this resultant level was still relatively low. 
In the Least Developed Countries, short-term debt never breached, on average, the level 
of 8% of the total during the 1990s and 2000s.  
So, the dangers associated with short-term capital inflows appear to be concentrated 
mainly in Emerging Economies. This danger manifested itself in the fall of 2013 as short-
term capital began to flood back to advanced economies in expectation that the eventual 
winding down of expansionary monetary policies in these economies would raise short-
term interest rates. 
4. Exchange Rate Policies 
The holding of international reserves has become increasingly important as a form of 
self-insurance for developing and emerging economies, especially in the light of the 
growing influence of unstable short-term capital flows. Reserve accumulation increased 
significantly in Emerging Economies in recent decades. Between the 1990s and 2000s, 
their international reserves as a ratio to GDP increased, on average, from about 14% to 
over 21% (Table 10). 
The stock of reserves also increased in Lower-Middle Income Countries and Least 
Developed Countries but their levels during the 2000s were lower than those in the EEs. 
In LMIs, reserves as a ratio to GDP averaged about 17% during the 2000s, up from an 
average of about 11% during the 1990s. In LDCs, reserves increased from about 11% of 
GDP during the 1990s to about 16% during the 2000s.  
But in all three groupings, reserves became significantly larger during 2008-2013 in 
response to the instabilities generated by the Global Financial Crisis. Maintaining such 
reserves is costly since it entails re-investing capital inflows in foreign short-term assets 
with a low rate of return instead of utilizing such inflows for productive investment, such 
as in social and economic infrastructure, which would have a much higher domestic rate 
of return. 
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Table 10. International Reserves as a Share of GDP for Income Groups and Cross-Cutting 
Groups  
EXCHANGE	RATE	POLICY
International	reserves
EEs
LMIs
LDCs
High	debt	countries
Transition	economies
Oil	&	gas	exporters
1990s 2000s 2000-07 2008-13
11.9 18.2 16.9 20.9
13.7 21.3 19.4 25.2
10.8 16.9 15.9 19.3
11.2 16.2 15.2 17.6
11.5 17.3 16.2 19.0
7.7 16.8 15.6 19.5
7.9 23.0 20.4 29.3  
Source: UNCTAD and World Bank data. 
Since international reserves are to a large extent held in the currencies of a limited 
number of advanced economies – in particular in US dollars, Euros and British Pounds – 
reserve accumulation by emerging and developing economies imposes an effective net 
resource transfer from poor to rich economies (Ocampo 2013).  
A basic rationale for holding a stockpile of international reserves is to use it as a means to 
manage a country’s exchange rate, either explicitly or implicitly. Very few countries have 
adopted, in practice, an exchange rate regime that allows ‘free floating’ of their 
currency’s value. Being able to sell reserve assets (such as US Treasury securities) allows 
countries to counteract, to some degree, depreciation of their domestic currency. 
However, many developing and emerging economies still remain in a strategically 
defensive position since they frequently run sizeable trade deficits. This tendency tends to 
put downward pressure on the value of their currencies. In some cases, developing and 
emerging economies also simultaneously run current-account surpluses but this outcome 
usually relies on receiving substantial international transfers, such as remittances or 
development assistance. 
Graph 3 shows the average trade balance and current-account balance during the 2000s of 
the three major income groups and the three cross-cutting groups. Only oil and gas 
exporting countries ran, on average, trade surpluses. In all other groupings, there were 
both average trade deficits and average current-account deficits, with the latter being 
smaller than the former. 
The Emerging Economies were in the strongest position, in the sense that during the 
2000s their average trade deficits and current-account deficits were -4% of GDP and -
3.2% of GDP, respectively. The Least Developed Countries were in the weakest strategic 
position since their average trade deficits and current-account deficits were -18.4% and -
6.2%, respectively. There was a large differential between the trade deficits and current-
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account deficits of LDCs because of the inflow of transfer payments, primarily in the 
form of grants and partly also due to remittance. 
 
 
Graph 3. Average Trade Balance and Current Account Balance by Income Group and 
Cross-Cutting Group (2000s)  
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Source: UNCTAD and World Bank data. 
Some countries can consistently generate trade surpluses at the same time as they suffer 
from current-account deficits. This has been the case, for example, for Brazil and South 
Africa. Both economies possess relatively well-developed equity markets. This condition 
can imply a continuous outflow of dividends payments combined at times with large 
periodic outflows of the equity investment itself.  
As Graph 3 illustrates, many of the oil and gas exporting countries have experienced a 
similar condition though the character of their capital outflows has been different. These 
countries tend to run substantial trade surpluses and through various investment vehicles, 
such as Sovereign Wealth Funds, they simultaneously send large quantities of capital 
abroad in search of the highest rates of return. China is in a similarly strong position since 
it continues to register substantial trade and current-account surpluses and recycles the 
resultant capital into international reserves. 
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5. Development Policies 
In addition to investigating macroeconomic outcomes, this research has supplemented 
this effort with an examination of ‘development outcomes’. These outcomes might not 
directly reflect the impact of macroeconomic policies. One of the most obvious 
indications of economically successful development policies is high investment levels. 
Hence, this research has examined the indicator of total investment as a ratio to GDP.  
Our research has also examined two related indicators that could serve as barometers of 
the outcomes from both public and private investment. These two indicators are 1) gross 
secondary school enrolment as a percentage of the total population of official secondary-
education age and 2) electrical power consumption expressed in Kilowat hours per capita. 
The first provides an indication of the extent of investment in social infrastructure and the 
second the extent of investment in economic infrastructure. 
The Commission on Growth and Development has identified high and accelerating 
investment rates as a decisive condition for accelerating and sustaining economic growth 
(Commission on Growth and Development 2008). Investment levels of at least 25% of 
GDP are generally considered as a necessary condition for economic development. But 
only in Emerging Economies have such levels of total investment prevailed on average. 
During the 2000s, average total investment as a ratio to GDP was 24.7% in this income 
group (Table 11). But this represented a slight decline from its average level of 25.2% 
during the 1990s. 
Compared to the level for EEs, average investment levels in Lower-Middle Income 
countries were slightly lower during the 2000s, i.e., 23% of GDP. And the average level 
was even lower in the Least Developed Countries, namely, 21.6%. There were only 
marginal increases in investment in these two income groups between the 1990s and 
2000s. 
Surprisingly, investment levels declined marginally across all three income groups during 
2000-2007. However, their levels of investment appeared to rise back up significantly 
during the period 2008-2013. For example, Emerging Economies were averaging 
investment levels that were almost 26% of GDP during 2008-2013. Investment levels in 
transition economies and oil and gas exporting countries also rose markedly, reaching 
averages, respectively, of about 27% of GDP and 26.5% of GDP during 2008-2013. 
In general, investment levels across the three income groups oscillated across the 1990s 
and 2000s. While average investment levels had reached credible levels during 2008-
2013, it is not certain that such levels will be maintained in the light of a probable global 
economic slowdown. 
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Table 11. Total Investment as Share of GDP for Income Groups and Cross-Cutting Groups     
DEVELOPMENT	POLICY
Total	investment
EEs
LMIs
LDCs
High	debt	countries
Transition	economies
Oil	&	gas	exporters
1990s 2000s 2000-07 2008-13
22.6 23.1 22.4 24.9
25.2 24.7 24.0 25.8
22.5 23.0 22.3 24.5
19.5 21.6 20.8 24.4
21.6 22.0 20.9 24.6
24.0 25.4 24.3 27.2
25.8 25.9 26.4 26.5  
Source: World Bank data. 
How have levels of investment translated into gains in economic and social infrastructure? 
Graph 4 depicts the average levels of electricity consumption per capita in the three 
income groups for the 1990s and 2000s. It shows that there were marked advances in 
electricity consumption among the Emerging Economies, from about 1900 kWh per 
capita during the 1990s to almost 2500 kWh per capita during the 2000s. 
Electricity consumption has been much lower in both Lower-Middle Income countries 
and Least Developed Countries. In LMIs average per capita levels of electricity 
consumption rose from about 840 kWh during the 1990s to about 940 kWh during the 
2000s. This represented a significant percentage increase (about 12%) but a much less 
impressive increase in absolute levels.  
In LDCs, average per capita levels of electricity consumption were abysmally low during 
the 1990s, at about 100 kWh. There was a 50% increase to close to 150 kWh in the 2000s, 
but this absolute increase was very small indeed.  
In other words, from the 1990s to the 2000s, the absolute level of electricity consumption 
per capita in the EEs remained about eighteen times higher than that in the LDCs. In 
similar fashion, the absolute level of electricity consumption per capita in the LMIs 
declined only slightly from eight times higher than that in the LDCs to six times higher. 
These statistics tend to support the thesis that there has been very little investment in 
economic infrastructure in the Least Developed Countries in particular in recent decades. 
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Graph 4. Average Per Capita Electricity Consumption by Income Group (kWh)  
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Source: World Bank data. 
An indicator that can reflect the extent of investment in social infrastructure is gross 
secondary school enrolment as a share of the relevant age group. Table 12 provides the 
trends in this indicator for income groups and cross-cutting groups. During the 2000s, 
such enrolment ratios (which can exceed 100%) were 87% in the Emerging Economies, 
and had reached 90% during the period 2008-2013. The enrolment ratios for LMIs were 
significantly lower, reaching the average of 69% during the 2000s and 75% during the 
period 2008-2013. 
Even though secondary school enrolment ratios for the Least Developed Countries started 
from an abysmally low average level of about 19% during the 1990s and almost doubled 
to 33% during the 2000s, and, furthermore, even reached over 40% during the period 
2008-2013, these absolute levels still lagged very far behind the levels of both the EEs 
and LMIs.  
These results imply that for LDCs to begin reaching the levels of both social and 
economic infrastructure of both LMIs and EEs, their investment levels would have to be 
raised substantially and maintained over an extended period of time. Even though the 
levels of electricity consumption per capita and secondary school enrolment ratios among 
Emerging Economies would inevitably begin to flatten out over time (as they reach a 
maximum feasible or statistical level), the task for LDCs in trying to make significant 
progress towards their levels would remain extremely difficult. 
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Table 12. Secondary School Enrolment Ratios for Income Groups and Cross-Cutting 
Groups 
DEVELOPMENT	POLICY
Enrolment	ratios
EEs
LMIs
LDCs
High	debt	countries
Transition	economies
Oil	&	gas	exporters
1990s 2000s 2000-07 2008-13
53.0 64.8 61.1 68.7
70.8 86.9 83.8 90.0
62.3 69.0 66.4 75.2
18.2 32.7 31.0 39.5
42.2 57.6 53.9 61.0
85.6 90.0 88.1 92.6
56.7 61.0 56.8 64.6  
Source: World Bank data. 
III. Summary of Group Results and Policy Implications 
The group averages discussed above give an initial glimpse into the overall trends in 
economic growth and employment generation and the relationship of these two outcomes 
to a broad set of ‘macroeconomic outcomes’ (related to fiscal policies, monetary policies, 
financial policies and exchange-rate policies). 
In general, the rates of growth of GDP across developing and emerging economies have 
appeared to be more impressive than the employment outcomes. There was indeed an 
upsurge in economic growth between the 1990s and 2000s, particularly among the Least 
Developed Countries. Yet changes in the quality of employment were more modest if one 
registers changes in indicators such as wage employment and vulnerable employment. 
Our reliance on a new ILO data set that registers changes in ‘labour incomes’ provides, 
however, a richer depiction of changes in the quality of employment. There were 
definitely increases in the share of the employed that progressed to a ‘non-poor’ status 
across the three income groups of Emerging Economies, Lower-Middle Income 
Countries and Least Developed Countries.  
While the 5.5 percentage point increase in the share of the ‘non-poor’ in Emerging 
Economies was the smallest among the three income groups, a much larger proportion of 
this total was constituted by the ‘developing middle class’ (earning $4 to $13 per day) as 
well as the ‘established middle class and above’ (earning more than $13 per day).  
In Lower-Middle Income Countries, the expansion of the share of the ‘non-poor 
employed’ by almost 9 percentage points was concentrated among the ‘developing 
middle class’. In contrast, most of the 7.6 percentage point increase in the ‘non-poor’ 
employed in the Least Developed Countries was constituted by those who moved out of 
poverty but still remained ‘near-poor’ (earning only between $2 and $4 per day).  
The general trends in fiscal outcomes between the 1990s and 2000s suggest that revenue 
did increase across the three income groups of EEs, LMIs and LDCs. But this expansion 
was heavily reliant on improving trends in transition economies and, especially, oil and 
gas exporting countries.  
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Moreover, the overall expansion of fiscal space (as a result primarily of rising income 
levels) coincided with fiscal tightening (the significant reduction of fiscal deficits), which 
tended to dampened the potential for expansionary fiscal policies. Moreover, the fiscal 
space of LDCs and even LMIs remained heavily reliant during the 2000s on the receipt of 
Official Development Assistance.  
Monetary policies were substantially tightened between the 1990s and 2000s in order to 
combat the widespread problem of high inflation rates that plagued the 1990s. This policy 
involved, for example, slowing the growth of broad money and raising real interest rates. 
However, real rates of interest remained inordinately high in Least Developed Countries 
and heavily indebted countries during the 2000s. This represented a major obstacle 
impeding the ability of these countries to raise their general level of investment. 
Financial policies also appeared to be ill-suited to the needs, in particular, of Lower-
Middle Income Countries and Least Developed Countries. For example, the level of 
domestic credit provided by the banking system remained relatively low in these two 
income groups. 
In contrast, in a significant number of Emerging Economies there appeared to be an 
excess of domestic credit, which contributed to financial instability. In addition, the share 
of total external debt that was short-term in nature in Emerging Economies increased 
significantly between the 1990s and 2000s, adding another dimension of potential 
instability linked to erratic international flows of portfolio investment. This rising 
problem led to greater openness of countries to adopting at least some limited forms of 
regulation of the capital account. 
Despite some progress in reducing the levels of external debt across the three income 
groups, average levels of such debt during the 2000s as a whole remained relatively high 
(approaching 60% in some cases) among some Emerging Economies and Lower-Middle 
Income Countries. However, because of the HIPC initiative, the average debt burden of 
LDCs dropped to about 45% of GNI during 2008-2013.  
Exchange rate policies have undergone some significant changes since the 1990s, 
especially since the Asia Financial Crisis in 1997-1998. Emerging Economies, in 
particular, have been striving to amass sizeable stockpiles of international reserves in 
order to protect their economies from the vagaries of international capital flows. LMIs 
and LDCs have also been striving to amass international reserves, but with notably less 
success. Nevertheless, many economies now strive to ‘manage’ their exchange rate, 
whether officially or unofficially. 
There appear to be two major reasons for the adoption of such exchange-rate policies. 
One prevailing reason is that many developing and emerging economies still suffer from 
significant trade deficits and current-account deficits. Not only is this condition a drag on 
economic growth and employment generation, but also it entails a degree of economic 
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instability since the value of the exchange rate of many countries will be constantly 
subject to pressures of depreciation. The second, and related, reason is that such pressures 
of depreciation could precipitate a damaging outflow of speculative investment, which 
has flooded into many of the major Emerging Economies in recent years. 
Lastly, this research has investigated trends in ‘development outcomes’, particularly as 
they have related to general trends in investment. Our primary indicator for this purpose 
has been total investment as a ratio to GDP.  
According to this indicator, investment began to approach credible levels (namely, 25% 
of GDP) across the three income groups only by 2008-2013. But across the 1990s and 
2000s as a whole, investment oscillated unpredictably, either growing only marginally or 
even declining in some cases. 
Substantially increasing investment levels in the Least Developed Countries should be a 
matter of high priority since the indicators in this research that reflect investments in 
social and economic infrastructure (namely, secondary school enrolment ratios and 
average electricity consumption) suggest that LDCs lag far behind both Emerging 
Economies and Lower-Middle Income countries. Despite some significant percentage 
increases in enrolment ratios and the levels of consumption of electricity in LDCs, their 
absolute levels remain far lower than those in Emerging Economies and even 
significantly below those in LMIs. 
This paper now examines the concrete experience of 16 developing and emerging 
economies. For each country a brief case study is presented. The 16 countries have been 
selected either because they have been relatively successful in generating economic 
growth and expanding productive employment or because they have been relatively 
important or well-known countries. 
Following the 16 case studies is a summary of the major macroeconomic outcomes, 
grouped together for comparison purposes by income group (Emerging Economy, 
Lower-Middle Income Country and Least Developed Country). 
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IV. Review of 16 Case Studies and General Initial 
Summaries 
 
A. Emerging Economies  
General Summary 
This research has conducted seven country case studies of Emerging Economies. These 
seven countries range across Asia (the People’s Republic of China and Thailand), Latin 
America (Brazil, Mexico and Peru) and the Mediterranean (Tunisia and Turkey). With 
the exception of China, the growth rates of these Emerging Economies were fairly 
modest during the 2000s.  
Also with the exception of China and, to some degree, Turkey, their improvements in 
employment were not remarkable. Because these countries had already substantially 
reduced extreme and moderate poverty, their most notable gains were in the expansion of 
the employed earning $4 - $13 per day (those described by the ILO as ‘developing 
middle class’) and, in some cases, the expansion of the employed earning $13 or more. 
What were the major macroeconomic problems that these Emerging Economies 
confronted? The majority of them did not command substantial public resources, as 
reflected in their relatively low levels of government revenue as a ratio to GDP. Brazil 
stands out as a stark exception, with an average ratio of 35% during the 2000s. Even in 
China, the revenue of the central government appeared to be low, though this was likely 
due, in part, to the exclusion of the revenue of regional governments. 
Leaving China to the side again, the level of total investment as a ratio to GDP tended to 
be low or only about average among our group of case study countries. No doubt, this 
tendency contributed to their unimpressive growth rates. For example, investment in 
Brazil was a very low 18%, on average, and the economy grew by only 3.6% on average 
during the 2000s. In Turkey investment averaged only about 20% of GDP during the 
2000s and its economy grew by less than 5%. 
Judging by consumer price inflation and money supply growth, monetary policies 
appeared to be relatively tight in most of these case study countries. The one exception 
was probably Turkey, where inflation still averaged 20% during the 2000s. But in a 
number of cases, such as in China, Peru, Thailand and Tunisia, inflation was averaging 
only 2-3%. In Brazil and Mexico, it was averaging 5-7%. Some of these Emerging 
Economies, especially Turkey and those in Latin America, were reacting strongly to 
damaging bouts of hyperinflation during the 1990s.  
Nevertheless, such tight monetary policies might have impeded their ability to achieve 
higher rates of economic growth. However, in these countries the real interest rate (the 
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lending rate adjusted for inflation) varied widely. In Brazil and Peru, for example, the 
average real rates of interest during the 2000s were about 46% and 19%, respectively. In 
sharp contrast, the average real rates of interest in Mexico, China and Thailand were quite 
low, averaging about 1%, 2% and less than 4%, respectively.  
These widely divergent rates raise serious concerns about the stability and health of the 
financial sectors in these countries. Either the real interest rate has been too high 
(discouraging domestic credit expansion) or too low (helping to excessively expand 
domestic credit). 
The divergent tendencies in the real interest rate were mirrored in the supply of domestic 
credit in these seven economies. In some cases, such as in Brazil, Thailand and Tunisia, 
domestic credit, as a ratio to GDP, was too high. For example, in Thailand, this indicator 
averaged over 130% during the 2000s and in Brazil about 84%. In other cases, such as 
Mexico and Peru, the domestic economy appeared to be short of credit. In Peru, for 
example, domestic credit averaged less than 20% of GDP and in Mexico less than 40% 
during the 2000s. It seems apparent that macroeconomic policies, such as interest rate 
policies, which could have had a direct effect on the financial sectors of these economies 
were not having a stabilizing effect. In other words, the financial sector, even in these 
relatively developed economies, appeared to be dysfunctional, to some degree. 
Many of these Emerging Economies were in a strong position in the wake of the Global 
Financial Crisis to receive a growing influx of external sources of credit. But these capital 
inflows were often short-term in nature. Thailand represents a striking example: its short-
term debt as a ratio to its total external debt averaged 35% during the 2000s.   
However, Thailand had also amassed a considerable stockpile of international reserves 
(namely, also 35% of GDP) in order to protect itself against the threat of a precipitous 
outflow of such portfolio investment. Evidently, it had learned well some of the difficult 
lessons from the Asia Financial Crisis in 1997-98. A primary lesson was to be in a strong 
position to protect the value of its exchange rate. 
Some of the six other Emerging Economies, such as China and Peru, had also amassed an 
impressive stockpile of international reserves.  China’s reserves as a ratio to GDP 
averaged about 34% of GDP during the 2000s and Peru’s reserves about 20%. However, 
the share of China’s total external debt that was short term in nature was also a very high 
47% during the 2000s. In Brazil, Mexico, Tunisia and Turkey, the relative size of their 
short-term debt also exceeded the size of their international reserves. These countries 
have placed themselves in a potentially vulnerable position should they cease, even on a 
temporary basis, to become magnets for speculative capital. 
China has remained in a fairly strong position with regard to its trade balance and 
current-account balance. Both averaged a positive 4-5% of GDP during the 2000s. 
Thailand has also maintained fairly stable trade and current-account surpluses, with its 
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current-account averaging, for example, almost 5% of GDP during the 2000s. In contrast, 
however, Tunisia and Turkey, and even Mexico to some degree, have left themselves 
vulnerable to capital outflows by consistently having run both trade and current-account 
deficits during the 2000s. And even Brazil ran a current-account deficit during the 2000s 
despite having generated modest trade surpluses. 
Brazil 
Brazil is well known as one of the developing world’s leading BRIC countries, but it is 
often regarded as a relatively underperforming Emerging Economy. Its growth of GDP 
did accelerate from an average of 1.7% during the 1990s to 3.6% during the 2000s. But 
the average growth for all Emerging Economies during the 2000s was 4.5%. 
During the 1990s, 85% of Brazil’s employed were already earning labour incomes above 
$2 per day (i.e., a ‘non-poor’ level). By the 2000s, this proportion had risen, on average, 
to 90%. But the country’s record in expanding quality employment was better than these 
statistics indicate. The employed earning labour incomes of $13 or more per day 
increased by 5.4 percentage points, while the employed earning between $4 and $13 
increased by 3.1 percentage points. This implies that the employed who were ‘near poor’ 
(only earning between $2 and $4) declined by 3 percentage points. The latter 
improvement should be expected for an Emerging Economy. 
BRAZIL 1990s 2000s
GDP 1.7 3.6
Employment indicators
All non-poor (USD 2-13+, PPP) 85.1 90.6
Near poor (USD 2-4, PPP) 18.1 15.1
Developing middle class (USD 4-13, PPP) 44.1 47.2
Middle class and above (USD 13+, PPP) 22.8 28.2
Wage employment 61.1 65.7
Vulnerable employment 34.8 29.9
Fiscal indicators
General government revenue 34.4 34.9
ODA 0.0 0.0
Fiscal balance -5.9 -3.1
Gross government debt n/a 68.7
Monetary indicators
Inflation 854.8 6.7
Broad money growth 739.8 17.0
Real interest rate 70.2 40.6
Financial indicators
Domestic credit 88.2 83.8
External debt stock 29.2 27.8
Short-term debt 18.4 12.8
Exchange rate indicators
Current account -1.7 -1.0
Trade balance 0.3 1.4
International reserves 5.4 9.7
Development indicators
Total investment 18.8 17.9
Secondary school enrolment n/a 106.0
Electricity consumption 1626.7 2033.7  
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Brazil’s fiscal record has been improving but it remains mixed. During the 2000s, 
average government revenue as a ratio to GDP was about 35%, significantly above the 
average for all Emerging Economies. It had a similar level of revenue in the 1990s. Also, 
Brazil had cut its fiscal deficit roughly in half, from -5.9% to -3.1%, between the 1990s 
and 2000s. However, its major fiscal problem was that its government debt still stood at 
almost 69% of GDP. 
The country did achieve major improvements on monetary outcomes. Like many Latin 
American countries, Brazil was afflicted with hyperinflation during the 1990s. Its 
consumer price inflation averaged an annual increase of over 800%. During the 2000s, 
this average had been drastically reduced, down to less than 7%. This trend coincided 
with a rate of growth of broad money of 17% during the 2000s, which was a bit below 
the EE average. 
However, Brazil’s real rate of interest remained extraordinarily high during the 2000s, i.e., 
slightly above 40%, despite having been dramatically reduced from its average level of 
about 70% during the 1990s. Such rates have posed exceedingly difficult problems for 
the economy as a whole, and help explain its modest rates of economic growth even 
during the 2000s. 
Apparently in contradiction, the domestic credit supplied by Brazil’s banking sector 
remained, if anything, excessive during the 2000s. As a ratio to GDP, such credit 
averaged about 84%, little changed from its average level during the 1990s. This level of 
credit during the 2000s was much higher than the EE average, which was less than 60%. 
Brazil did not, however, confront difficult problems associated with its external debt. Its 
external debt stock, measured relative to GNI, remained comparatively low over the 
1990s and 2000s, not exceeding 30% of GDP on average. In addition, its short-term debt 
as a share of total external debt decreased over time, leaving the country with a 
proportion that averaged less than 13% during the 2000s, which was well below the EE 
average.  
Also, Brazil maintained a fairly strong trade position during the 2000s: its trade balance 
averaged 1.4% of GDP. Meanwhile, it current-account deficit was only -1% of GDP, 
down from an average of -2.7% during the 1990s.  
However, Brazil still remained in a relatively weak position in terms of its holdings of 
international reserves. Though they increased from their average level in the 1990s, they 
still represented only about 10% of GDP during the 2000s. This was well below the EE 
average of about 21% and even below the average of 18% for all developing and 
emerging economies. This low level of reserves implies that Brazil has limited ability to 
influence the variability of its exchange rate. 
Brazil still faces a major constraint on its economic growth and employment generation. 
This has been its relatively low level of total investment, which averaged only 17.9% of 
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GDP during the 2000s, and had even declined from its average level of 18.8% during the 
1990s. This condition implies that despite the apparent abundance of domestic credit, 
there is still inadequate financing of investment.  
Nevertheless, as a fairly developed Emerging Economy, Brazil has still achieved some 
credible levels of investment in social and economic infrastructure. For example, its gross 
secondary school enrolment ratio was over 100% during the 2000s—well above the 
average for all Emerging Economies. However, its investment in economic infrastructure 
has lagged somewhat behind. For example, its average electricity consumption during the 
2000s was still only about 2000 Kilowat hours per capita. This was well below the EE 
average of over 2400 Kilowat hours per capita. This is probably due to inadequate public 
investment in economic infrastructure, which remains a common complaint across Brazil. 
China, People’s Republic of  
The People’s Republic of China has performed exceedingly well on GDP growth and 
qualitative improvements in employment. Its average growth rate of GDP during the 
2000s, i.e., 10.2%, was one of the highest among emerging economies (surpassed only by 
the growth rates of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan). Its rate of growth during the 1990s 
was also 10%. 
In addition, China’s share of wage/salary employment in total employment increased by 
almost ten percentage points between the 1990s and 2000s while there was a 
corresponding decline of 10 percentage points in the share of vulnerable employment. 
Most remarkably, the share of the ‘non-poor’ employed increased by almost 37 
percentage points between the 1990s and 2000s. This is the largest increase among the 
entire set of 145 countries in our sample. The bulk of the overall increase in the three 
combined strata was in the ‘developing middle class’ (the employed earning $4-13 per 
day), which rose by 24 percentage points alone. These results indicate that China has 
been a very successful developing country by carrying out substantial employment-
enhancing structural change in its economy. 
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How are China’s macroeconomic outcomes related to these growth and employment 
successes? Its greatest achievements appear to be its substantial surpluses on its trade 
balance and current account balance. During the 2000s, both surpluses averaged 4-5% of 
GDP, significantly above the corresponding levels of about 2% of GDP during the 1990s. 
Not surprisingly, its holdings of international reserves in the 2000s were also well above 
average, at an astounding level of about 34% of GDP. These successes resulted 
essentially from the country’s aggressive export-led strategy, which was able to provide 
widespread manufacturing employment. Such success was also tied to strict management 
of its exchange rate. 
China has also been able to maintain relatively low levels of debt, both government debt 
and total external debt. Its government debt averaged only about 20% of GDP during the 
2000s and its external debt averaged only about 11% of GNI. Both of these levels 
represented only marginal increases over the levels in the 1990s. Even if central 
government debt were augmented by provincial and local government debt, it would 
remain relatively moderate at around 45% of GDP (IMF 2013).  
China’s fiscal deficit during the 2000s remained relatively contained, at -1.7% of GDP—
down from -2.3% during the 1990s. This level was achieved despite the apparent lack of 
central government revenue, which averaged only 18% of GDP during the 2000s. The 
CHINA 1990s 2000s
GDP 10.0 10.2
Employment indicators
All non-poor (USD 2-13+, PPP) 27.2 64.0
Near poor (USD 2-4, PPP) 21.6 31.1
Developing middle class (USD 4-13, PPP) 5.5 29.5
Middle class and above (USD 13+, PPP) 0.2 3.3
Wage employment 32.3 42.1
Vulnerable employment 66.1 56.4
Fiscal indicators
General government revenue 13.4 18.0
ODA 0.5 0.1
Fiscal balance -2.3 -1.7
Gross government debt 7.7 19.8
Monetary indicators
Inflation 7.8 2.3
Broad money growth 27.0 17.7
Real interest rate 1.7 1.6
Financial indicators
Domestic credit 97.7 136.0
External debt stock 16.2 11.3
Short-term debt 17.1 46.7
Exchange rate indicators
Current account 1.7 4.8
Trade balance 2.1 4.3
International reserves 10.7 34.2
Development indicators
Total investment 39.1 42.5
Secondary school enrolment 49.5 72.7
Electricity consumption 728.2 1856.6
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modest size of the central government’s revenue base is misleading since this statistic 
does not take account of provincial levels of revenue.  
Also, the recent actions of the central government in the aftermath of the Global 
Financial Crisis suggest that it wields considerable power over the deployment of lending 
by the domestic banking sector. This dimension sets China apart from most other 
developing and emerging economies. 
One of the most remarkable features of China’s economy is its extraordinarily high level 
of total investment. During the 2000s China’s total investment as a ratio to GDP averaged 
over 42% (higher than even its 1990s’ level of 39%). However, maintaining such a level 
of investment as a bulwark of growth is not likely to be sustainable over time. And the 
government has already stated its commitment to boosting domestic demand through 
significant increases in personal consumption. 
One of the advantages of China’s traditional emphasis on domestic investment (along 
with promoting external trade surpluses) is that it has not had to confront the problem of 
high levels of inflation. During the 2000s China’s consumer price inflation averaged only 
about 2%. This level was much lower than that achieved during the 1990s, namely, about 
8%. No doubt, subduing inflation has been due, in part, to the containment of sources of 
domestic demand, particularly consumer demand. The growth of China’s broad money 
supply has also not been excessive, averaging about 18% during the 2000s. This has been 
slightly lower than the average for all emerging economies. 
Meanwhile, however, China’s real rate of interest has remained exceptionally low, at less 
than 2% during both the 1990s and 2000s. This kind of rate helped spur a potentially 
unhealthy rise in domestic credit through the country’s banking system. Though such an 
increase could be justified, to some extent, as a means to counteract the fallout from the 
Global Financial Crisis after 2008, the average level of China’s domestic credit as a ratio 
to GDP was quite high throughout the 2000s, at about 140%, or about 40 percentage 
points higher than in the 1990s. China’s low real interest rate and its expansive domestic 
credit are worrying signs of potential instability in its financial sector. 
Another worrying development has been the rise in the share of short-term debt in total 
external debt. By the 2000s this share averaged almost half, namely, about 47% of the 
total. Nevertheless, this development does not appear to pose a serious immediate 
problem since the country’s total external debt, as already mentioned, remained only 
about 11% of GNI during the 2000s. 
China has also been able to build up an impressive buffer against the potential of perverse 
capital outflows through its amassing of very substantial international reserves. During 
the 2000s these reserves averaged about 34% of GDP. This percentage represented about 
twice their relative size during the 1990s. In absolute terms, this stockpile in the 2000s 
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was one of the largest in the world, and was decisive in maintaining the value of the US 
Dollar, the world’s reserve currency. 
Hence, in macroeconomic terms, China has provided many valuable lessons for other 
developing and emerging economies.  The central government has managed the economy 
in a number of fundamental ways. However, how it now makes the transition to an 
economy more decisively driven by domestic demand remains a paramount issue. Also, 
indicators such as those for the real rate of interest and the extent of domestic credit 
provided by its banking system suggest that its financial system has left itself vulnerable 
to potential instabilities. Such vulnerabilities are now common among many Emerging 
Economies.  
Mexico 
While the average growth rate of GDP for all developing and emerging economies during 
the past two decades increased between the 1990s and 2000s, Mexico’s growth rate 
declined significantly, from 3.5% to only 2.2%. However, Mexico did register some 
gains in employment. 
Wage and salary employment increased by 7 percentage points between the two decades 
to reach 65% of all employed. Vulnerable employment correspondingly declined, 
covering only 30% of all employed during the 2000s.  
The share of the non-poor employed (earning more than $2 per day) in total employment 
also increased between these two decades, i.e., by about 7 percentage points. In the 1990s, 
this group had already represented about 87% of all employed. What is most remarkable, 
however, is that the share of the ‘near-poor’ employed (earning only between $2 and $4 
per day) declined by over 4 percentage. Along with this decline, the share of those 
considered ‘developing middle class’ (earning $4-13) expanded by over 5 percentage 
point and the share of the ‘established middle class and above’ (earning more than $13) 
expanded by 6 percentage point. 
Mexico modestly improved its fiscal position between the 1990s and 2000s. For example, 
its general government revenue rose from 19% of GDP during the 1990s to 21% in the 
2000s on average. Over the same period, its average fiscal deficit improved from -3.1% 
of GDP to -2.5%. And its gross government debt declined from 46% of GDP to 42%. 
However, its general government revenue was still relatively low, especially compared to 
the average for all Emerging Economies of about 29%. 
Unlike some other Latin American countries that suffered from hyperinflation during the 
1990s, Mexico experienced only an average of about 20% consumer price inflation. And 
by the 2000s, it had substantially reduced this rate to only 5% on average. But Mexico’s 
growth rate of broad money had also plummeted to less than 10%. These trends suggest 
that monetary policy was unusually tight during the 2000s.  
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But what is most striking in this latter decade is the unusually low average real interest 
rate, i.e., only about 1%. It is difficult to believe that financial institutions would be 
motivated to lend credit on the basis of such a low rate of return. This suspicion is 
confirmed by the lack of domestic credit provided by banks. As a ratio to GDP, such 
credit dropped from 41% during the 1990s and 37% during the 2000s. The average for all 
Emerging Economies during the latter decade was 56%. 
Unlike some other Emerging Economies, Mexico had not run up a large external debt. In 
fact, its external debt, as a ratio of GNI, had fallen over the two decades from 40% to 
only 23%. In addition, the country did attract a large inflow of short-term capital. The 
share of short-term debt in its total external debt had declined over the two decades from 
a little over 20% to just below 14%. 
Mexico was also able to improve its external position between the 1990s and 2000s. 
While its trade deficit remained between -1.6% of GDP and -1.7%, its current-account 
deficit dropped from -3.2% of GDP to -1.3%. At the same time, while Mexico managed 
to build up its stock of international reserves, which reached almost 9% during the 2000s, 
this percentage was well below the average for all Emerging Economies, namely, over 
21%. However, if the country had not significantly exposed itself to the vagaries of short-
term speculative capital and was not running sizeable current-account deficits, there was 
no need for a large stockpile of reserves. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEXICO 1990s 2000s
GDP 3.5 2.2
Employment indicators
All non-poor (USD 2-13+, PPP) 86.8 93.9
Near poor (USD 2-4, PPP) 21.1 16.8
Developing middle class (USD 4-13, PPP) 48.3 53.6
Middle class and above (USD 13+, PPP) 17.4 23.4
Wage employment 57.6 64.7
Vulnerable employment 37.7 30.7
Fiscal indicators
General government revenue 19.2 21.1
ODA 0.1 0.0
Fiscal balance -3.1 -2.5
Gross government debt 46.4 42.2
Monetary indicators
Inflation 20.4 5.0
Broad money growth 34.5 9.3
Real interest rate 8.3 1.1
Financial indicators
Domestic credit 41.0 37.0
External debt stock 40.0 23.0
Short-term debt 20.4 13.8
Exchange rate indicators
Current account -3.2 -1.3
Trade balance -1.6 -1.7
International reserves 5.5 8.9
Development indicators
Total investment 23.0 24.0
Secondary school enrolment 59.6 82.5
Electricity consumption 1375.7 1815.5
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During the 2000s, Mexico’s total investment, as a ratio to GDP, reached only 24%. This 
approximated the average for Emerging Economies. Based on such investment levels, 
Mexico has made some progress on investments in both social and economic 
infrastructure. Its secondary school enrolment ratio did increase significantly over the 
course of the two decades, from under 60% to 82.5%. And its average electricity 
consumption per capita did increase from almost 1400 kWh to over 1800. However, its 
electricity consumption during the 2000s remained well below the Emerging Economy 
average of almost 2500 kWh. 
Thus, overall, Mexico only managed sub-par rates of economic growth during the 2000s. 
At the same time, many of the fiscal, monetary, financial and external-account outcomes 
did improve moderately between the 1990s and 2000s. However, its government revenue, 
or ‘fiscal space’, has remained restricted and its investment levels have not grown beyond 
average levels. Thus, while Mexico has positioned itself economically to avoid some of 
the common pitfalls of monetary and financial instability, it has not placed itself in a 
position that would generate dramatic increases in growth or employment.  
Peru 
Unlike Mexico, Peru has managed to accelerate its average rate of growth of GDP 
between the 1990s and 2000s. This average rate soared from only 3.2% to 5.6%. 
However, the indicators for wage employment and vulnerable employment show very 
little change in the structure of employment in the country. The share of wage 
employment declined only slightly over the course of the two decades while the share of 
vulnerable employment remained virtually the same. 
The data for the employed based on absolute levels of labour incomes show a somewhat 
more positive picture. Overall, the share of the ‘non-poor’ employed (those earning more 
than $2 per day) rose by more than 10 percentage points, to about 80%. At the same time, 
the share of the ‘near-poor’ employed (earning only $2-4 per day) declined slightly, by 1 
percentage point. This reduction implied that there was about a 7 percentage point 
increase in the ‘developing middle class’ (earning $4-13) and almost a 5 percentage point 
increase in the ‘established middle class and above’ (earning more than $13 per day).  
Peru’s fiscal position has provided a mixed picture. Its government revenue as a ratio to 
GDP was quite low during the 2000s, at only about 19%. For example, for all Emerging 
Economies the average was a little over 29% of GDP. However, Peru did manage during 
the 2000s to run, on average, almost a balanced budget (-0.1% of GDP). And its stock of 
government debt was only 35% of GDP. 
Peru’s monetary position was not a favourable one during the 2000s. Its rate of consumer 
price inflation was a mere 2.6%, an extraordinarily low rate for an Emerging Economy. 
Part of the explanation was the slow rate of growth in its broad money base, which grew 
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by less than 10% during the 2000s. Of course, Peru was forced to battle with 
hyperinflation during the 1990s, when its inflation rate averaged over 800%. But, in a 
sense, it appears that it has over-reacted by excessively tightening up monetary 
conditions during the 2000s. 
Has the real rate of interest declined to a moderate level as a result of such monetary 
tightening? No, Peru’s average real rate of interest during the 2000s was a little over 19%. 
Such a level is bound to restrict the expansion of domestic credit. And the statistics for 
the 2000s appear to bear out this concern. Domestic credit as a ratio to GDP was only 
about 19% of GDP during the 2000s. The average for all Emerging Economies for the 
same period was close to 56%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the same time, Peru has succeeded in substantially reducing its external debt stock. 
While such debt represented over 61% of GDP during the 1990s, it had fallen to a little 
under 40% by the 2000s. In addition, Peru had reduced its exposure to the instability of 
portfolio investment. Short-term debt as a share of total external debt fell from an average 
of almost 23% during the 1990s to an average of only a little over 12% during the 2000s. 
Peru has also improved its external accounts. Between the 1990s and 2000s, it was able 
to reduce an average trade deficit of -3.4% of GDP into an average trade surplus of 2.4%. 
PERU 1990s 2000s
GDP 3.2 5.6
Employment indicators
All non-poor (USD 2-13+, PPP) 69.2 80.1
Near poor (USD 2-4, PPP) 25.4 24.4
Developing middle class (USD 4-13, PPP) 35.0 42.3
Middle class and above (USD 13+, PPP) 8.7 13.4
Wage employment 36.7 35.4
Vulnerable employment 58.3 58.9
Fiscal indicators
General government revenue n/a 19.1
ODA 1.1 0.5
Fiscal balance n/a -0.1
Gross government debt n/a 35.0
Monetary indicators
Inflation 807.9 2.6
Broad money growth 694.2 9.6
Real interest rate 28.1 19.2
Financial indicators
Domestic credit 16.6 19.2
External debt stock 61.5 39.5
Short-term debt 22.7 12.1
Exchange rate indicators
Current account -5.7 -1.0
Trade balance -3.4 2.4
International reserves 13.3 20.5
Development indicators
Total investment 20.9 21.1
Secondary school enrolment 71.8 88.2
Electricity consumption 571.0 867.8
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Meanwhile, its current account deficit shrank from a sizeable -5.7% of GDP to only -1%, 
which is a manageable level. In addition, Peru was able to build up its stock of 
international reserves, from a little over 13% of GDP to 20.5%, which was about average 
for Emerging Economies. 
Peru’s record on investment was not exemplary during the 1990s and 2000s. Total 
investment as a ratio to GDP stayed pretty much constant at about 21% of GDP between 
the two decades. This represented a relatively low level for an Emerging Economy since 
the average during the 2000s for this group was about 25%.  
This general lack of investment has been reflected mostly in the modest improvement in 
average electricity consumption per capita. This indicator rose from about 570 kWh to 
only a little less than 870 kWh. This latter level stands in stark contrast to the much 
higher average level for all Emerging Economies, namely, almost 2500 kWh. However, 
Peru did make progress on increasing the secondary school enrolment ratio. This ratio 
rose from about 72% of the relevant population group to over 88%. 
In many ways, Peru has been a relatively successful country, at least in terms of raising 
its economic growth and making some progress on expanding quality employment. Also, 
many of its macroeconomic indicators suggest that it made significant progress between 
the 1990s and 2000s.  
However, it still confronts some strategic weaknesses, such as a relatively low level of 
government revenue and a below-average level of total investment. Moreover, its real 
rate of interest has remained too high and its domestic credit too scarce. Such weaknesses 
in its financial conditions (which are common among many other developing and 
emerging countries) are likely to impair its ability to maintain relatively high levels of 
economic growth and carry out meaningful structural change in its employment 
conditions. 
Thailand 
Between the 1990s and 2000s, Thailand experienced a slowdown in its GDP from 5.3% 
to 4%, on average. However, having already achieved a relatively high level of income 
per capita as an established Emerging Economy, Thailand is likely to face development 
challenges that differ significantly from those confronting LMIs or LDCs. 
Thailand did manage to increase wage employment by 7.5 percentage points between the 
1990s and 2000s and, correspondingly, reduce vulnerable employment by 8 percentage 
points.  
Also, Thailand succeeded in expanding the share of its non-poor employed by over 10 
percentage points between the 1990s and 2000s. At the same time, it reduced the size of 
its ‘near-poor’ employed by 4.4 percentage points. This signifies that it increased, in fact, 
the share of the employed earning more than $4 per day (i.e., the ‘developing middle 
class’) by more than 11 percentage points. Thus, these indicators suggest that Thailand 
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did succeed in carrying out some meaningful structural change in its employment 
conditions. 
Since the 1990s, Thailand has improved some of its core fiscal indicators. For example, 
its general government revenue edged up from 19% of GDP to 21% between the 1990s 
and 2000s. But this revenue level was still well below the average for all Emerging 
Economies, which was over 29% during the 2000s. 
Between the 1990s and 2000s, Thailand also managed to rein in its fiscal deficit, from -
2.2% of GDP on average to -0.6%. But during the same period its gross government debt 
edged up from 40.5% of GDP to 47.1% (the latter being about average for an Emerging 
Economy).  
The inflation rate, broad money growth and the real interest rate were all roughly halved 
between the 1990s and 2000s. Already at a relatively low level of 5% during the 1990s, 
consumer price inflation dropped further to only 2.6% during the 2000s. Simultaneously, 
broad money growth slowed down from 15.2% to 8% and the real interest rates fell from 
around 8% to below 4%.  These trends suggest that monetary policies were substantially 
tightened, perhaps too dramatically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THAILAND 1990s 2000s
GDP 5.3 4.0
Employment indicators
All non-poor (USD 2-13+, PPP) 81.6 92.3
Near poor (USD 2-4, PPP) 37.2 32.8
Developing middle class (USD 4-13, PPP) 37.8 49.1
Middle class and above (USD 13+, PPP) 6.5 10.4
Wage employment 35.2 42.7
Vulnerable employment 62.4 54.4
Fiscal indicators
General government revenue 19.2 21.1
ODA 0.6 0.0
Fiscal balance -2.2 -0.6
Gross government debt 40.5 47.1
Monetary indicators
Inflation 5.0 2.6
Broad money growth 15.2 8.0
Real interest rate 8.1 3.6
Financial indicators
Domestic credit 133.8 131.6
External debt stock 57.6 34.0
Short-term debt 35.9 35.0
Exchange rate indicators
Current account -2.7 3.2
Trade balance -1.5 4.8
International reserves 20.6 35.9
Development indicators
Total investment 36.3 26.0
Secondary school enrolment 43.6 71.7
Electricity consumption 1134.8 1882.8
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However, the marked reduction in the real interest rate had little effect on expanding 
domestic credit. Such credit remained above the very high level of 130% of GDP during 
the 2000s. This level was well beyond the average even for Emerging Economies 
(namely, about 56%).  Such an abundance of domestic credit should be a matter of 
serious concern since it indicates that Thailand confronts the danger of financial 
instability.  
However, Thailand did manage to substantially reduce its external debt between the 
1990s and 2000s, from the relatively high level of about 58% of GNI to only 34%. At the 
same time, though, there was little change in the share of short-term debt in Thailand’s 
total external debt. This share remained at roughly 35%, which represents a very high 
level, even for an Emerging Economy. 
Thailand did exceedingly well in improving its trade and current-account balances 
between the 1990s and 2000s. For example, its trade account improved from an average 
deficit of -1.5% of GDP to an average trade surplus of +4.8% of GDP. In a similar 
fashion, Thailand’s current account improved from a deficit of -2.7% of GDP to a surplus 
of +3.2% of GDP.  
As a result, although Thailand’s stock of international reserves was already large during 
the 1990s, at over 20% of GDP, it ballooned to about 36% during the 2000s. Such a large 
stock of reserves provides Thailand with considerable leverage in protecting the value of 
its exchange rate, whether from trade or financial shocks. 
No doubt one key reason that Thailand’s rate of growth of GDP slowed down between 
the 1990s and the 2000s is that its total investment declined significantly, from over 36% 
of GDP to only 26%. However, Thailand’s investment rate during the 2000s was still 
above-average for Emerging Economies though it now lagged well behind the investment 
levels of such dynamic economies as China. 
As a result of investment in social infrastructure, Thailand’s secondary school enrolment 
ratio rose between the 1990s and the 2000s, from about 44% to 72% of the relevant age 
population. Average electricity consumption per capita also improved, rising from an 
average of 1130 kWh during the 1990s to 1880 kWh during the 2000s.  
However, the average attainments during the 2000s for both secondary school enrolment 
and electricity consumption were still well below the average for all Emerging 
Economies (which were about 87% and almost 2500 kWh, respectively).  Hence, it 
appears that more intensified investment in both social and economic infrastructure is 
justified. 
Thus, Thailand’s economy has been performing relatively well across various dimensions 
between the 1990s and 2000s. And employment gains have followed suit. On the 
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macroeconomic front, Thailand did manage to reduce its fiscal deficits, reduce its money 
supply growth and inflation rates, improve its trade and current-account balances and 
lower its external debt.  
However, Thailand’s very ample supply of domestic credit is definitely a potential source 
of financial instability as is the share of its short-term debt (such as unstable portfolio 
investment) in its total external debt. At the same time, though, Thailand has built up an 
impressive ‘fortress’ of international reserves, which it could utilize to stem any attack on 
the value of its exchange rate. 
Unfortunately, the government of Thailand does not command the kind of fiscal 
resources that are normally available to other governments of Emerging Economies and 
the country has allowed its relatively high level of total investment to drop dramatically 
over the course of roughly the last two decades even though its investments in social and 
economic infrastructure still lag significantly behind the levels in many other Emerging 
Economies. 
Tunisia 
Like Turkey, Tunisia is another Mediterranean Emerging Economy that has achieved 
only a modest degree of economic success during the 2000s. During this period its GDP 
grew at 3.9%. This represented a decline from its 5% average growth during the 1990s.  
There were also only moderate changes in the structure of its employment. Wage and 
salary employment already averaged over 67% of all employment during the 1990s and it 
expanded by only about 4 percentage points during the 2000s. Vulnerable employment, 
which was already relatively low in the 1990s, representing about 30% of the total at that 
time, also declined by only about 4 percentage points during the 2000s. 
The employed did benefit from moderate gains in labour incomes. The share of the 
employed who were ‘non-poor’ increased by only about 8 percentage points between the 
1990s and the 2000s. But this effect was due to a much larger 12 percentage-point 
increase in the employed that had become part of its ‘developing middle class’ (earning 
$4-13 per day) combined with a decline of over 5 percentage points in the ‘near poor’ 
(earning only $2-4 per day). Overall, these gains appear to be consistent with Tunisia’s 
moderate record of economic growth over both the 1990s and the 2000s. 
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TUNISIA 1990s 2000s
GDP 5.0 3.9
Employment indicators
All non-poor (USD 2-13+, PPP) 85.1 93.1
Near poor (USD 2-4, PPP) 31.9 26.5
Developing middle class (USD 4-13, PPP) 47.7 60.4
Middle class and above (USD 13+, PPP) 5.5 6.2
Wage employment 67.3 71.2
Vulnerable employment 30.0 25.7
Fiscal indicators
General government revenue 27.3 28.1
ODA 1.5 1.2
Fiscal balance -2.7 -2.1
Gross government debt 66.4 53.2
Monetary indicators
Inflation 4.9 3.3
Broad money growth 9.7 10.8
Real interest rate n/a n/a
Financial indicators
Domestic credit 66.2 67.7
External debt stock 60.4 58.2
Short-term debt 10.9 19.4
Exchange rate indicators
Current account -4.2 -3.4
Trade balance -4.3 -3.2
International reserves 8.0 15.6
Development indicators
Total investment 26.0 24.4
Secondary school enrolment 56.3 85.3
Electricity consumption 765.5 1124.1  
What were the macroeconomic factors behind these trends? Tunisia’s total investment as 
a ratio to GDP did average about 24% during the 2000s. This level was down slightly 
from its record during the 1990s (i.e., 26%). Still, compared to the record of other 
Emerging Economies, Tunisia’s general level of investment could not be considered 
below-average. 
Tunisia was not generating much growth through its external accounts. During the 2000s 
its trade account averaged a deficit of about -3% of GDP and its current-account a deficit 
of a roughly similar magnitude. These levels were down a bit from the average of about -
4% during the 1990s. But Tunisia had not managed to substantially boost its holding of 
international reserves. On average, its reserves were 15.6% of GDP during the 2000s, 
significantly lower than the overall average for all Emerging Economies (i.e., about 21%). 
Tunisia’s record on its fiscal accounts was better than its external accounts during the 
2000s. For an Emerging Economy, its revenues as a ratio to GDP were quite low, at only 
about 28% of GDP (roughly in line with the average of about 29% for all EEs). Tunisia 
ran, on average, a fiscal deficit of about -2% of GDP during the 2000s (down from about 
-2.7% during the 1990s). 
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The level during the 2000s could be considered a manageable level of fiscal deficits. But 
the government still had to deploy a significant portion of its financing for servicing a 
debt that represented about 53% of GDP. However, it had already succeeded in reducing 
this debt from its onerous level of 66% of GDP during the 1990s. 
The external debt burden of Tunisia during the 2000s was also still relatively high, at 
58% of GNI, and was down only slightly from its level of 60% during the 1990s. The 
share of short-term debt in Tunisia’s external debt was about 19%. Though this level was 
about average for EEs, it still represented a significant rise from the country’s average 
level of only about 11% during the 1990s. 
Domestic credit appeared to be plentiful in Tunisia during the 2000s. It stood at about 
69% of GDP, which represented an above-average level. This level could not be 
considered excessive. At the same time, consumer price inflation was very low during the 
2000s, at about 3%. And this rate was down from a 5% inflation rate during the 1990s. 
This trend raises a concern about whether monetary policy was being tightened 
excessively. Certainly, the rate of growth of broad money, which averaged only about 
11% during the 2000s, was well below the average of about 19% for all Emerging 
Economies. 
It appeared that, in general, Tunisia was doing moderately well during the 2000s. 
However, both its external debt and its government debt appeared to be major drags on its 
economic prospects. Partly as a result, its economic growth achieved only a modest rate, 
i.e., less than 4%, during the 2000s. This might have also been due to excessively tight 
monetary policies, which appeared to be geared to subduing inflation along with a 
generally weak fiscal position that was constrained by the lack of revenue. 
Turkey 
Turkey is an interesting Emerging Economy to examine since it has maintained fairly 
moderate rates of economic growth during the 1990s and 2000s. Its GDP growth rate in 
the 1990s was 4% and in the 2000s 4.6%. Associated with these rates of growth were 
significant changes in the structure of employment. For example, between the 1990s and 
the 2000s, vulnerable employment declined by 14.6 percentage points while wage and 
salary employment rose by 15.3 percentage points.  
As an Emerging Economy, the most important barometer of the structural change that has 
been associated with rising labour incomes would be the combined share of the 
‘developing middle-class’ and the ‘established middle class’. During the 1990s, this 
combined share already represented about two-thirds of all of the employed. And it rose 
in Turkey by almost 9 percentage points by the 2000s—while the share of the ‘near poor’ 
declined by almost 7 percentage points.  
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TURKEY 1990s 2000s
GDP 4.0 4.6
Employment indicators
All non-poor (USD 2-13+, PPP) 93.1 95.2
Near poor (USD 2-4, PPP) 26.7 19.9
Developing middle class (USD 4-13, PPP) 53.5 59.1
Middle class and above (USD 13+, PPP) 12.9 16.2
Wage employment 39.7 55.0
Vulnerable employment 54.3 39.7
Fiscal indicators
General government revenue n/a 31.9
ODA 0.3 0.1
Fiscal balance n/a -4.0
Gross government debt n/a 53.1
Monetary indicators
Inflation 77.2 20.6
Broad money growth 93.3 28.2
Real interest rate n/a n/a
Financial indicators
Domestic credit 27.9 51.5
External debt stock 40.7 44.4
Short-term debt 21.3 19.7
Exchange rate indicators
Current account -0.9 -4.1
Trade balance -1.1 -3.2
International reserves 6.4 10.5
Development indicators
Total investment 23.5 19.5
Secondary school enrolment 57.1 83.1
Electricity consumption 1226.7 2036.8  
Turkey was not in an exceptionally strong position in macroeconomic terms in the 2000s. 
Its government did command some revenues: they represented about 32% of GDP (about 
the same level as in the 1990s). However, this level in the 2000s was about average for 
all countries in our sample. In addition, its average fiscal deficit was -4% of GDP, over 
twice the average size for all Emerging Economies. Not surprisingly, the debt burden of 
its government was also above-average, i.e., about 53% of GDP. 
Its external debt stock was more manageable. It averaged about 44% of GNI during the 
2000s. This level was only slightly above its own average level during the 1990s. But it 
was below the average for all EEs. The extent of Turkey’s domestic credit was about 
average: 53% of GDP. This represented a doubling of its credit levels from the 1990s. 
Turkey’s short-term debt during the 2000s (about 20% of its total external debt) was also 
about average. Hence, Turkey’s financial conditions were not unstable. 
However, monetary conditions in Turkey were not enviable. Consumer price inflation 
still averaged over 20% during the 2000s, driven, in part, by an average 28% growth in 
its broad money. Nevertheless, these levels were well below the perilous conditions that 
the country had faced in the 1990s, when inflation was averaging 77% based on broad 
money growth of close to 100%. 
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During the 2000s, Turkey’s trade account and current account were both in deficit (about 
-3% and about -4% on average, respectively). These represented manageable levels 
compared to conditions in many other developing and emerging economies. However, 
the sizes of these deficits were significantly larger than they were in the 1990s. And 
Turkey had not built up a substantial stock of international reserves in order to protect it 
against unstable international capital flows. During the 2000s its international reserves 
averaged only about 10% of GDP, about half the average size of reserves for all 
Emerging Economies. 
Unlike some other fairly successful Emerging Economies (China in particular), Turkey 
has not succeeded in implementing an investment-led development strategy. Its total 
investment as a ratio to GDP averaged only about 20% during the 2000s while the 
average for all EEs was about 25%. Of particular concern is that Turkey’s level of 
investment during the 2000s actually declined from its level in the 1990s, when it was 
23.5%. 
Hence, in general terms, while Turkey has made significant progress since the 1990s, 
especially in quelling high levels of inflation, its monetary conditions remain problematic 
and its external accounts remain weak. In addition, its level of investment has remained 
sub-par and its fiscal position remains vulnerable. 
 
B. Lower-Middle Income Countries 
General Summary 
This research has conducted five case studies of Lower-Middle Income countries. These 
countries include Indonesia and Vietnam (South Asia), Uzbekistan (Central Asia), Egypt 
(North Africa) and Ghana (sub-Saharan Africa). All of these economies grew during the 
2000s at rates of economic growth that exceeded the average for LMIs. For example, 
Uzbekistan and Vietnam grew at 7%, Ghana at 6% and Indonesia and Egypt at about 5%. 
Vietnam appeared to be the most successful in improving the quality of its employment, 
at least in terms of the aggregate effects. Between the 1990s and 2000s, the share of its 
total employed that earned incomes higher than $2 per day (the threshold for moderate 
poverty) increased by about 30 percentage points (from a relatively small initial base of 
about 15%). While about one-third of these employed began earning incomes between $4 
and $13 per day, the other two-thirds moved from conditions of moderate or extreme 
poverty into a ‘near-poor’ economic status (namely, earning $2 to $4 per day). Thus, the 
latter group remained vulnerable to falling back into poverty. 
Both Ghana and Indonesia also registered some successes in moving the employed out of 
poverty conditions between the 1990s and 2000s. The share of the employed earning non-
poor incomes increased in both countries by about 20 percentage points. But in the case 
of Ghana, about 60% of these newly ‘non-poor’ employed began earning incomes of $4 
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per day or more. Namely, they entered the status of ‘developing middle class’ or above 
(though recent recalculation of Ghana’s income per capita in PPP terms might be part of 
the explanation). In contrast, in Indonesia, only about one third of the employed who 
achieved the status of non-poor employed between the 1990s and 2000s began earning 
such a level of income. This implies that about 69% of them remained ‘near-poor’. 
It seems appropriate that as countries become Lower-Middle Income and move up within 
this category, they should be judged primarily by their success in moving the employed 
out of both poverty and ‘near-poverty’. 
The average revenue, as a ratio to GDP, of all Lower-Middle Income countries was 25% 
during the 2000s. By this standard, two of our five case study countries had below-
average government revenue: Ghana and Indonesia. Another two, Egypt and Vietnam, 
had roughly average revenue. But, in stark contrast, Uzbekistan, a sizeable transition 
economy, had average revenue that exceeded 35% of GDP. In other words, it had 
potentially much greater ability to finance public investment in economic development.  
While Uzbekistan consistently ran an average fiscal surplus during the 2000s (i.e., 
representing 2.8% of GDP), Egypt and Ghana just as consistently ran sizeable average 
fiscal deficits (of -8.7% and -5.1% of GDP, respectively). More worrisome, Ghana was 
receiving, on average, Official Development Assistance that represented 9% of its GNI 
during the 2000s. Vietnam also ran an average fiscal deficit of -2.3% of GDP despite the 
fact it was receiving ODA equivalent to 3.8% of its GNI. 
Uzbekistan, Vietnam and Indonesia maintained manageable levels of government debt 
(i.e., at least less than 50% of GDP). Uzbekistan was notable for shouldering average 
debt of only about 28% of GDP. But Ghana averaged government debt of about 60% of 
GDP and Egypt of about 86%. Hence, with the exception of Uzbekistan, none of our five 
case study countries were in a particularly strong fiscal position during the 2000s. 
Inflation was not a daunting problem during the 2000s for Egypt, Indonesia and Vietnam: 
their average consumer price inflation was under 8%. But Uzbekistan was averaging 
inflation of about 15% and Ghana of about 17% during the 2000s. The average growth of 
broad money was particularly high in Ghana, at about 35%. So, monetary policies 
appeared to be particularly problematic in Ghana, and potentially challenging in 
Uzbekistan. 
Expanding domestic credit in order to finance productive investment should be a priority 
for Lower-Middle Income countries. Hence, a dysfunctional financial sector would 
represent a major barrier to development. This appears to be the case in Ghana, where 
domestic credit represented, on average, only about 30% of GDP during the 2000s. In 
stark contrast, expansion of domestic credit appeared to be excessive in Egypt and 
Vietnam, where it exceeded 80% of GDP during the 2000s.  
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The external debt stock of these five Lower-Middle Income countries only exceeded 60% 
of GNI in Ghana. And Ghana also suffered from a relatively high share of short-term debt 
in its total external stock, namely, almost 17% (compared to the LMI average of about 
12%). No doubt there has been some degree of recent speculation on Ghana’s exchange 
rate as the country has emerged as a significant exporter of oil. 
Lower-Middle Income countries place themselves in a precarious economic position if 
they continually register trade and current-account deficits. But both Indonesia and 
Uzbekistan consistently ran both trade and current-account surpluses during the 2000s. 
However, both Ghana and Vietnam consistently ran both trade and current-account 
deficits. Ghana’s performance was especially troubling since its average trade deficit was 
over -13% of GDP and its average current-account deficit over -6%. While Egypt 
continually ran trade deficits during the 2000s, its current account registered, on average, 
a small surplus, helped by inflows of personal remittances from abroad averaging 4.5% 
of GDP. 
Unlike some of the seven Emerging Economies analyzed above, none of the five LMIs 
were able to amass sizeable stockpiles of international reserves. Thus, they were not in a 
strong position to manage their exchange rates. Based on available data, Vietnam was 
able to build up the largest stockpile of reserves, which represented, on average, about 
17% of GDP during the 2000s. But this was roughly only the overall average for all 
Lower-Middle Income countries. 
During the 2000s there were not large gaps in total investment as a ratio to GDP across 
Emerging Economies, Lower-Middle Income Countries and Least Developed Countries. 
The average for LMIs was about 23% (while it was under 25% for EEs and almost 22% 
for LDCs). While in Uzbekistan total investment approximated this average, investment 
levels for both Indonesia and Vietnam exceeded it. Vietnam’s investment level was 
especially high, averaging almost 36% of GDP during the 2000s. In this respect, 
Vietnam’s performance was similar to that of the People’s Republic of China. 
However, the levels of social and economic infrastructure achieved during the 2000s 
were only noteworthy in Egypt and Uzbekistan. In both cases, the levels of secondary 
school enrolment and average kilowatt hours of electricity per capita both significantly 
exceeded the LMI averages. In contrast, these levels remained particularly low in Ghana. 
While Egypt and Uzbekistan no doubt benefited from past investments in social and 
economic infrastructure, Ghana, which only recently became an LMI, did not benefit 
from such a history. 
Though all five case study countries were relatively successful examples during the 
2000s of economic development, i.e., economic growth and employment generation, 
Uzbekistan stands out as the most consistently successful (especially in view of its 
difficult transition to a more market-based economy in the 1990s). Indonesia and 
Vietnam have also been relatively successful. But Egypt appears to be languishing and 
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Ghana continues to display many of the economic characteristics of a Least Developed 
Country. 
Egypt 
Egypt is a Lower Middle Income country that was able to maintain moderate rates of 
GDP growth during the 1990s and 2000s. During the 1990s its growth was 4.1% and 
during the 2000s it picked up to 4.7%. However, there appears to have been little 
improvement in employment outcomes. Between the 1990s and 2000s, wage employment 
increased by less than 2 percentage points from a level of about 58% of all employment. 
There was a parallel decline in vulnerable employment of about -1.7 percentage points 
from its average level during the 1990s of over 26% of all employment. 
The record on labour incomes was only slightly better. From a base that was already 
fairly high, at 80% of all employment, there was about a 6 percentage point increase in all 
of the employed who were ‘non-poor’. Most of this increase was among the employed 
who had become ‘developing middle-class’ (earning $4-$13 per day). In fact, there was a 
slight decline in the share of the ‘established middle-class’, namely, those with labour 
incomes above the US poverty threshold of $13 per capita. 
Why have Egypt’s growth and employment records been relatively unimpressive? Its 
government has had a slightly sub-par level of revenue, i.e., an average of about 26% of 
GDP during the 2000s. Yet the government continued to run hefty fiscal deficits, 
averaging almost -9% of GDP during the 2000s. And its general government debt had 
ballooned to about 86% of GDP. These represented major macroeconomic problems. 
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EGYPT 1990s 2000s
GDP 4.1 4.7
Employment indicators
All non-poor (USD 2-13+, PPP) 80.0 86.2
Near poor (USD 2-4, PPP) 50.4 53.3
Developing middle class (USD 4-13, PPP) 26.1 31.5
Middle class and above (USD 13+, PPP) 3.4 1.4
Wage employment 57.8 59.6
Vulnerable employment 26.3 24.6
Fiscal indicators
General government revenue n/a 26.1
ODA 6.2 1.0
Fiscal balance n/a -8.7
Gross government debt n/a 86.1
Monetary indicators
Inflation 10.9 7.8
Broad money growth 14.0 13.3
Real interest rate 6.0 4.1
Financial indicators
Domestic credit 82.0 88.9
External debt stock 58.2 27.0
Short-term debt 9.5 7.7
Exchange rate indicators
Current account 1.0 0.6
Trade balance -7.3 -4.5
International reserves 21.6 17.1
Development indicators
Total investment 20.9 19.0
Secondary school enrolment 70.2 80.6
Electricity consumption 787.0 1337.8  
Its external debt position was, however, much better: its debt was only 27% of GNI on 
average during the 2000s. This level represented a drop from an average of about 58% of 
GNI during the 1990s. And its share of short-term debt in this total during the 2000s was 
only about 8%.  
However, domestic credit generation appeared to be particularly high. During the 2000s 
domestic credit represented 88% of GDP, slightly higher than the level during the 1990s. 
The average level of credit for all LMIs during the 2000s was less than half this 
percentage. Yet despite such plentiful credit, Egypt had a woeful record on total 
investment: it represented only 19% of GDP, below even the average level for LDCs. 
Hence, credit generation did not appear to be translated into increases in investment. This 
condition represented a potential source of financial instability. 
Despite sub-par levels of investment, Egypt still boasted, paradoxically, above-average 
levels of achievement for a LMI in secondary school enrolment and in average energy 
consumption per capita. In fact, these levels had increased significantly between the 
1990s and 2000s. During the 1990s, Egypt total investment had averaged a slightly 
higher level of about 21% of GDP. 
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Despite the ready availability of domestic credit, Egypt did not suffer from inordinately 
high inflation rates during the 2000s. Its consumer price inflation averaged less than 8% 
(which was below its average level of about 11% during the 1990s). Its growth of broad 
money during the 2000s was only about 13%, well below the average of all emerging and 
developing economies. Correspondingly, its average real rate of interest was only about 
4%. This rate was significantly below the worryingly high average of about 14% for all 
LMIs. 
Egypt’s international position has also not appeared to be problematic. It is true that its 
trade deficits averaged -4.5% of GDP during the 2000s (though this level was down from 
about -7% during the 1990s). But its average current-account balance was slightly 
positive during both the 1990s and 2000s. And its international reserves, which were 
about 17% of GDP during the 2000s, were about average.  
Like Tunisia, Egypt had achieved moderate levels of progress in terms of economic 
growth and employment generation. And its general economic conditions did not appear 
to be unstable or precarious during the 2000s. However, its fiscal condition was 
particularly weak since its government ran sizeable fiscal deficits and shouldered a 
relatively high debt burden. And the provision of domestic credit by its banking system 
did not appear to be channelled into financing productive investment, which languished 
at below-average levels for a Lower-Middle Income country. 
Ghana 
Ghana was successful in accelerating its GDP growth between the 1990s and the 2000s. 
And in 2010 it became a Lower-Middle Income Country (partly due, however, to a 
recalculation of its GDP). While its GDP grew by an average of 4.4% during the 1990s, 
this rate jumped to 6.4% during the 2000s.  
In recent years, growth has accelerated because of the export of oil discovered off 
Ghana’s coast. Thus, even in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, namely, during 
2008-2013, Ghana’s average growth rate reached the high level of 8.1%. 
As a result of such growth, wage employment in Ghana rose from an average of about 
16% of total employment in the 1990s to almost 22% during the 2000s. In similar 
fashion, vulnerable employment shrank from a 1990s average of 81.4% to a 2000s 
average of 73.5%.  
Also, the share of the non-poor employed in total employment rose substantially between 
the 1990s and 2000s, from 32.6% to 53.5%, or by more than 20 percentage points. The 
‘near-poor’ employed (earning only $2-4 per day) increased by 8.8 percentage points, 
accounting for about 33% of the total increase in the ‘non-poor’ employed.  
But, most importantly, the ‘developing middle class’ (earning $4-13 per day), increased 
even more, i.e., by 11.3 percentage points, accounting for about 57% of the total increase 
in the ‘non-poor’ employed. 
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GHANA 1990s 2000s
GDP 4.4 6.4
Employment indicators
All non-poor (USD 2-13+, PPP) 32.6 53.5
Near poor (USD 2-4, PPP) 24.4 33.2
Developing middle class (USD 4-13, PPP) 8.0 19.3
Middle class and above (USD 13+, PPP) 0.1 1.0
Wage employment 15.9 21.8
Vulnerable employment 81.4 73.5
Fiscal indicators
General government revenue 10.5 16.6
ODA 9.9 9.0
Fiscal balance -7.5 -5.1
Gross government debt 63.7 59.7
Monetary indicators
Inflation 27.5 16.9
Broad money growth 36.0 35.5
Real interest rate n/a n/a
Financial indicators
Domestic credit 21.4 29.6
External debt stock 79.9 65.8
Short-term debt 10.6 16.8
Exchange rate indicators
Current account -5.4 -6.3
Trade balance -7.5 -13.5
International reserves 7.8 11.6
Development indicators
Total investment 19.9 22.3
Secondary school enrolment 37.1 48.2
Electricity consumption 344.9 281.2  
 
On the back of increased growth rates, government revenue in Ghana increased from a 
meagre average of only 10.5% of GDP during the 1990s to almost 17% during the 2000s. 
But Ghana’s government was still running an average fiscal deficit of about -5% of GDP 
during the 2000s.  
Ghana’s revenue level was reaching 20% of GDP during 2012, but this was below the 
average of about 25% for all Lower-Middle Income countries. And Ghana was still 
receiving Official Development Assistance that averaged 9% of GNI during the 2000s. 
Thankfully, this average dropped to 5.2% of GNI during 2008-2013. 
Ghana did manage to marginally reduce its gross government debt between the 1990s and 
2000s. This form of debt, expressed as a ratio to GDP, fell from about 64% of GDP to 
only about 60% for the 2000s and to about 40% for 2008-2013.  
Ghana did make some progress in reducing inflation between the 1990s and 2000s. 
Consumer price inflation dropped, for example, from 27.5% to just below 17%. 
However, the growth of the money supply remained pretty much unchanged, at about 
36%. So, external factors, such as the price of key imports, must have played a key role 
in lowering the price level. 
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Unfortunately, information on the real interest rate in Ghana is unavailable but domestic 
credit provided by the banking system did increase to some degree between the 1990s 
and 2000s, i.e., from 21.4% of GDP to 29.6%. But the resultant level for the 2000s was 
still well below the average of about 40% for all LMIs.  
Ghana benefitted substantially from a reduction of its external debt burden. During the 
1990s, this external debt, as a ratio to GNI, was about 80% on average, which was a 
relatively onerous level. During the 2000s, this debt declined to an average of about 66%.  
Moreover, during 2008-2013 Ghana’s average external debt declined further, to below 
30% of GNI. This reduction resulted from the HIPC debt-relief initiative, which Ghana 
had joined in 2001. 
However, there was an ominous rise in the share of short-term debt in Ghana’s total 
external debt. This increase was from 10.6% during the 1990s to almost 17% in the 
2000s. And by 2008-2013, short-term debt exceeded, on average, 20% of all external 
debt.  This is an unfortunate trend, which policymakers in Ghana should strive to contain 
in order to address the danger of capital outflows. 
While Ghana benefitted significantly in the past from the export of gold, oil production 
started off its coast in 2010. As a result, since 2011 oil has contributed about 20% of the 
country’s export revenue (IMF Article IV, 2013).  
Despite this apparent windfall, both Ghana’s trade balance and its current-account 
balance deteriorated during the 2000s. The country’s trade deficit almost doubled 
between the 1990s and 2000s, namely, from -7.5% of GDP to -13.5%. Its current account 
also widened during the same period from -5.4% of GDP to -6.3%.  
The one notable countertendency was the rise in Ghana’s stock of international reserves, 
from about 8% of GDP during the 1990s to close to 12% of GDP during the 2000s. Since 
this stock is quite low even by LMI standards, policymakers should prioritize expanding 
this form of protection against exchange-rate instability, especially because of the 
probable appreciation of Ghana’s exchange rate. 
Total investment, as a ratio to GDP, did increase in Ghana between the 1990s and 2000s. 
But this increase was relatively modest, from just under 20% to 22.3%. However, the 
average for all LMIs was only 23% of GDP during the 2000s. 
Ghana did make some progress in raising its secondary school enrolment ratio, i.e., from 
37% of the relevant age group to 48%. But the LMI average for the 2000s was much 
higher, at 69%.  
Regrettably, available statistics suggest that the average electricity consumption per 
capita in Ghana actually declined between the 1990s and 2000s. But even if there had 
been no such decline, the average electricity consumption in Ghana would have still been 
only about one-third of the average for all Lower-Middle Income Countries (about 940 
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kWh). Hence, Ghana still has to make significant progress in expanding its investment in 
social and economic infrastructure. 
There are many positive signs of progress in Ghana. It has grown fairly rapidly, 
especially during the 2000s, and has recently become a Lower-Middle Income country.  
Also, it can enjoy the potential benefits of being a significant exporter of oil. On the back 
of economic growth, Ghana has also made some significant progress in expanding the 
share of the employed that are non-poor, especially those considered ‘developing middle 
class’. 
But its government still runs substantial fiscal deficits and faces a dauntingly high debt 
burden. Despite any recent windfalls from oil, Ghana’s government still needs to 
augment its revenue base, as well as contribute to an overall increase in total investment 
in the country, especially in both social and economic infrastructure.  
Ghana definitely benefitted from substantial debt relief during the 2000s but it still relies 
heavily on short-term debt. And it continues to run substantial trade and current-account 
deficits. Hopefully, increased oil revenues in the future will help allay these problems. 
But there is still much work to be done in the midterm in strengthening the fiscal stance 
of the government and improving the country’s external trade and current-account 
position. 
Indonesia 
Despite suffering the disruption from Asia’s Financial Crisis in 1997-98, Indonesia has 
been able to sustain credible rates of economic growth over roughly the past 20 years. In 
fact, its growth of GDP accelerated from 4.5% during the 1990s to 5.3% during the 2000s. 
As a consequence, it has managed to double the share of the employed that are ‘non-
poor’ (earn more than $2 per day), from 20% to 40%. However, only about 6 percentage 
points of this 20 percentage-point gain represented the employed who had reached labour 
incomes of $4-13 per day. In addition, those employed that had earned more than $13 per 
day still represented less than 1% of all employed. Hence, almost 70% of all of the 
employed who had left poverty were still ‘near-poor’ during the 2000s (earning only $2-4 
per day). 
Despite gains in economic growth, general government revenue has remained fairly 
modest in Indonesia. By the 2000s, it had risen to only 18.4% of GDP (though some 
government revenue is generated at the regional level). 
Despite low revenue, the government has managed to maintain fairly small fiscal deficits. 
During the 2000s, for example, they averaged -1% of GDP. In addition, Indonesia’s debt 
level during the 2000s was only 45% of GDP on average, and declined further to a 30% 
average during 2008-2013. 
 55 
The government has also managed to reduce consumer price inflation, from an average of 
14.6% in the 1990s to 7.9% in the 2000s. Concurrently, broad money growth halved from 
almost 28% to less than 14% annually. These trends facilitated, no doubt, the decline in 
the real interest rate, which fell from 8% during the 1990s to below 4% during the 2000s.  
Concomitantly with the fall in the real interest rate, domestic credit provided by banks 
declined moderately, from over 52% of GDP during the 1990s to about 45%. But the 
resultant level of domestic credit during the 2000s was about average for a Lower-Middle 
Income country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indonesia was also able to improve its external debt burden. While its stock of external 
debt during the 1990s was high, at 80% of GNI, this level had been reduced to 50% 
during the 2000s.  Indonesia had also managed to reduce the share of short-term debt in 
its total external debt, from about 19% to less than 14%. 
Indonesia significantly improved its external position during the 2000s. Its trade balance 
expanded from 2.3% of GDP during the 1990s to almost 5% during the 2000s. 
Concurrently, Indonesia’s current account improved from a deficit of -1.2% of GDP to a 
surplus of 2.2%. Indonesia was also able, as a result, to modestly expand its holding of 
international reserves, from about 10% of GDP to 13.5%, though this level during the 
INDONESIA 1990s 2000s
GDP 4.5 5.3
Employment indicators
All non-poor (USD 2-13+, PPP) 19.9 41.8
Near poor (USD 2-4, PPP) 15.3 30.9
Developing middle class (USD 4-13, PPP) 4.2 10.1
Middle class and above (USD 13+, PPP) 0.4 0.8
Wage employment 33.8 33.0
Vulnerable employment 62.9 64.0
Fiscal indicators
General government revenue 16.2 18.4
ODA 1.2 0.5
Fiscal balance -0.5 -1.0
Gross government debt n/a 49.4
Monetary indicators
Inflation 14.6 7.9
Broad money growth 27.7 13.4
Real interest rate 7.9 3.7
Financial indicators
Domestic credit 52.5 45.3
External debt stock 80.1 52.1
Short-term debt 18.9 13.8
Exchange rate indicators
Current account -1.2 2.2
Trade balance 2.3 4.8
International reserves 10.1 13.5
Development indicators
Total investment 27.6 26.3
Secondary school enrolment 46.3 65.4
Electricity consumption 260.5 502.6
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2000s was still below-average (especially for a country that had suffered dramatically 
from the Asian Financial Crisis). In fact, Indonesia’s average current account surplus 
during the 2000s turned into an average deficit of -0.5 of GDP during 2008-2013, in the 
wake of the Global Financial Crisis. 
One of the most important drivers of Indonesia’s success has been its investment. Total 
investment as a ratio to GDP declined slightly from 27.6% of GDP during the 1990s to a 
little over 26% during the 2000s. But this latter level was still above-average for a Lower-
Middle Income country. Moreover, during the period 2008-2013, its average investment 
exceeded 30%. 
A commitment to investment in social infrastructure has been reflected in the significant 
rise in the secondary school enrolment ratio, from about 46% during the 1990s to about 
63% during the 2000s.  
However, although Indonesia was able to increase its average consumption of electricity 
per capita, from 260 kWh to 500 kWh, between the 1990s and the 2000s, the country’s 
level in the 2000s was still far below the average for all LMIs, i.e., about 940 kWh. This 
statistic suggests that there has been under-investment in economic infrastructure in 
Indonesia over the last two decades. This has not been uncommon, even among countries 
that otherwise have had a credible macroeconomic record. 
In summary, Indonesia has done fairly well across-the–board on improving its 
macroeconomic conditions. But it still suffers from some weaknesses that are quite 
common among many developing and emerging economies. These include a lack of 
fiscal revenue, a shortage of domestic credit and low investment in economic 
infrastructure. There also appears to be a lack of meaningful structural change in 
conditions of employment in the country. While ‘working poverty’ has been reduced, the 
employed who are ‘near-poor’ have remained a large group. 
Uzbekistan 
Uzbekistan is an interesting transition economy in macroeconomic terms. During the 
1990s, it had a smaller decline in income than most of the economies formerly linked to 
the Soviet Union. In the end, its average growth for the whole period was 1%.  
But during the 2000s it averaged a growth rate of GDP 6.8%, which was well above the 
average for all Lower-Middle Income countries. Like China and Vietnam, its 
policymakers have endeavoured to manage the economy. And its deployment of 
macroeconomic policies has mirrored this strategic approach. 
As a legacy of being a transition economy, about half of its workers were already earning 
wages or salaries in the 1990s. This share improved modestly in the 2000s, coincident 
with a modest decline in workers vulnerably employed. More impressively, the share of 
the employed that managed to rise above poverty-level incomes—and become ‘near-
poor’, ‘developing middle-class’ or ‘established middle-class or above’—increased by 13 
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percentage points. However, most of these employed (about two-thirds) remained ‘near-
poor’ (earning $2-4 per day). Roughly the other third became ‘developing middle-class’ 
(earning $4-13 per day). 
Unlike some other transition economies, such as Vietnam, Uzbekistan has managed to 
generate consistent surpluses on both its trade account and current account. During the 
2000s, its trade surplus averaged 3.7% of GDP and its current-account surplus 5.2%. This 
record contrasts with the country’s plight during the 1990s, when both its trade account 
and current account averaged -3% to -4% deficits during the initially difficult transition 
period. 
 
UZBEKISTAN 1990s 2000s
GDP 1.0 6.8
Employment indicators
All non-poor (USD 2-13+, PPP) 29.7 43.0
Near poor (USD 2-4, PPP) 25.9 35.0
Developing middle class (USD 4-13, PPP) 3.4 7.4
Middle class and above (USD 13+, PPP) 0.4 0.6
Wage employment 48.9 52.0
Vulnerable employment 50.4 47.2
Fiscal indicators
General government revenue 35.9 35.6
ODA 0.6 1.1
Fiscal balance -4.9 2.8
Gross government debt 7.3 28.4
Monetary indicators
Inflation 370.0 15.3
Broad money growth n/a n/a
Real interest rate n/a n/a
Financial indicators
Domestic credit n/a n/a
External debt stock 15.3 32.3
Short-term debt 9.8 4.5
Exchange rate indicators
Current account -3.2 5.2
Trade balance -3.9 3.7
International reserves n/a n/a
Development indicators
Total investment 27.1 22.6
Secondary school enrolment 95.0 98.8
Electricity consumption 1979.3 1716.3  
But the surpluses during the 2000s have been due primarily to its exports of energy 
products, natural gas in particular, as well as other primary commodities such as gold. 
The country has also remained a major exporter of cotton despite the comparative decline 
in this traditional sector.  
Since Uzbekistan’s major trading partners have been relatively diverse, including China 
and Turkey as well as Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, the country has not suffered 
appreciably from the effects of the global recession. 
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Uzbekistan has also managed to run fiscal surpluses. These surpluses averaged 2.8% of 
GDP during the 2000s. This record contrasts with its average deficits of about -5% during 
the 1990s. The surpluses in the 2000s benefitted greatly from the government’s relatively 
high level of revenue, which averaged over 35% of GDP. As a result, the government has 
continued to confront a relatively modest level of debt, only about 28% of GDP. Hence, 
the country is noteworthy for having maintained a relatively strong fiscal position.  
The external debt stock of the country has also remained relatively low, at about 32% of 
GNI during the 2000s though this level represented an increase from the average during 
the 1990s of about 15%. Uzbekistan’s share of short-term debt in the total in 2000s was 
very low, at only 4.5%. This ratio was less than half what it was during the 1990s (i.e., 
about 10%). Hence, the country has not increased its vulnerability to the instability of 
global portfolio flows. 
Uzbekistan has also been able to maintain a credible level of total investment. During the 
2000s economy-wide investment averaged about 23% of GDP, which corresponded 
closely to the average of all Lower-Middle Income Countries. However, Uzbekistan’s 
investment level during the 1990s was higher, at about 27% of GDP. 
In contrast, the economies of both China and Vietnam have been much more investment-
driven. Their investment levels have ranged between 30% and 40% of GDP, which have 
been remarkably high levels. But China has already recognized that it must make a 
gradual transition to an economy that incorporates more domestic consumption demand. 
Drawing in part on its legacy as a transition economy, Uzbekistan has maintained 
relatively high levels of social and economic infrastructure. For example, the country’s 
secondary school enrolment ratios have been maintained at over 95% and average 
Kilowat hours per capita have been about 1700, well above the average of only about 940 
Kwh for all Lower-Middle Income countries. However, the country’s access to electricity 
dipped in comparison to the 1990s, when the average Kilowat hours per capita were close 
to 2000 Kwh. 
While many external analysts have not contested the basic accuracy of many of 
Uzbekistan’s macroeconomic indicators, they have explicitly questioned the accuracy of 
its inflation estimates. The IMF estimates, for example, that the country’s consumer price 
inflation averaged about 15% during the 2000s.  
Since internationally vetted data are lacking on such key related indicators as broad 
money growth, the real interest rate and the size of domestic credit, it is difficult to make 
a judgment on such monetary and financial outcomes. And this lack of data also makes it 
difficult to form a comprehensive judgment on the overall viability of Uzbekistan’s 
macroeconomic policies and its development strategy.  
Nevertheless, on many basic macroeconomic indicators, such as on the country’s 
domestic fiscal position, including its government debt, its trade and current-account 
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positions, and its international financial liabilities, Uzbekistan does appear to have 
maintained a relatively strong position. 
Vietnam 
Vietnam’s strategy of development is often compared to that of China. Though 
Vietnam’s strategy and macroeconomic policies resemble China’s to some degree, 
Vietnam remains a poorer country and has not succeeded in replicating the success of 
China’s manufacturing export-led strategy.  
While China has advanced rapidly to become an Emerging Economy during the late 
2000s, Vietnam has become a Lower-Middle Income Country. Vietnam does generate 
significant exports of clothing, shoes and electronics, and its main trading partners have 
been China, the US and Japan. But its trade and current-account balances have remained 
mostly in deficit during the 2000s. On average, its trade deficit was about -3% of GDP 
and its current-account deficit almost -8% of GDP during the 2000s. The sizes of these 
deficits were higher than they were in the 1990s.  
VIETNAM 1990s 2000s
GDP 7.4 7.1
Employment indicators
All non-poor (USD 2-13+, PPP) 15.1 46.8
Near poor (USD 2-4, PPP) 13.1 34.1
Developing middle class (USD 4-13, PPP) 1.8 11.9
Middle class and above (USD 13+, PPP) 0.2 0.8
Wage employment 17.1 25.2
Vulnerable employment 82.3 74.4
Fiscal indicators
General government revenue 19.9 26.2
ODA 4.0 3.8
Fiscal balance -0.9 -2.3
Gross government debt n/a 43.1
Monetary indicators
Inflation 21.1 7.9
Broad money growth 30.9 28.2
Real interest rate 8.4 2.4
Financial indicators
Domestic credit 21.5 79.2
External debt stock 172.4 38.8
Short-term debt 10.5 12.4
Exchange rate indicators
Current account -5.5 -3.2
Trade balance -2.4 -7.8
International reserves 8.0 16.9
Development indicators
Total investment 23.5 36.0
Secondary school enrolment 46.5 n/a
Electricity consumption 161.6 608.4  
Vietnam’s record on achieving economic growth and expanding quality employment has 
been above-average. During the 2000s its GDP rate of growth averaged 7.1% (compared 
to 7.4% during the 1990s). While the share of its total employment that is wage and 
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salaried employment remained modest, at about 25% during the 2000s, the country 
succeeded in boosting this share by about 8 percentage points compared to it level during 
the 1990s. And Vietnam correspondingly reduced the share of vulnerable employment by 
the same number of percentage points. 
What is most impressive about its employment performance is that it has increased the 
share of the employed that have escaped poverty by 30 percentage points. This certainly 
represents the best record among Lower Middle-Income Countries. But, in fact, the 
majority of the employed (i.e., about 21 percentage points out of the total) who escaped 
poverty remained ‘near-poor’, earning $2-4 per day. However, another 10 percentage 
points did become ‘developing middle-class’, earning $4-13 per day. 
Where Vietnam has managed to emulate China has been in the size of its domestic 
investment. During the 2000s, Vietnam’s total investment as a ratio to GDP averaged 
almost 36%. This represented a qualitative leap from a level of about 24% during the 
1990s. This represents a major macroeconomic achievement. 
Yet its economic infrastructure, such as the degree of access to electricity (as proxied by 
Kilowat hours per capita), has remained low by the standards of Lower-Middle Income 
countries. Its average level during the 2000s was only a little over 600 Kwh while the 
group average was about 940 kWh. This discrepancy suggests that Vietnam has to 
continue prioritizing investment, especially in improving access to economic 
infrastructure. 
Vietnam has succeeded in expanding domestic credit through its banking system in order 
to fuel economic development. During the 2000s, its domestic credit, as a ratio to GDP, 
averaged almost 80% (up from about 22% during the 1990s). The level in the 2000s was 
much lower than China’s (which was 140%). But Vietnam has maintained similarly low 
real rates of interest (at an average of 2.4% during the 2000s). During the 1990s, the 
country’s average real interest rate was much higher, at over 8%. Hopefully, Vietnam’s 
financial sector will not contribute to instability in the future by inundating the economy 
with cheap credit. 
Vietnam’s broad money growth was also above-average during the 2000s, at about 28% 
per year. Despite the possibility that such trends could become more problematic, its 
consumer price inflation was contained at about 8% during the 2000s, which was about 
average for LMIs. Also, this inflation level was a pronounced improvement over its 
average inflation of about 21% during the 1990s. 
Vietnam has also managed to keep its fiscal deficits under control. These deficits 
averaged -2.3% during the 2000s. However, its government revenue has been a bit above-
average, at about 26% of GDP (with almost 4 percentage points of this total attributable 
to ODA). Vietnam’s government debt has also remained at below-average levels 
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(compared to the levels for both LMIs and Emerging Economies). During the 2000s, its 
average, as a ratio to GDP, was 43%. 
While Vietnam has run significant trade deficits during the 2000s, its external debt stock 
has remained below-average, at just under 40% of GNI. During the 1990s, its debt stock 
was much higher, at over 170% of GNI. Vietnam’s short-term debt as a ratio to total 
external debt during the 2000s remained about average for LMIs, at about 12%--up only 
slightly from about 10% during the 1990s.  
So, while Vietnam would be well advised to improve its external trade and financial 
position, it has not yet placed itself in a particularly vulnerable position. Meanwhile, the 
country has managed to progress relatively rapidly from being a low-income country to 
being a middle-income country. From a relatively low base, wage and salary employment 
has improved significantly, and a sizeable proportion of the employed now earn levels of 
income significantly above poverty levels.  
Despite having its growth rate initially set back by the global recession, its trade position 
has improved in recent years, partly as a result of a managed depreciation of its exchange 
rate. This policy of management of the exchange rate has been important in improving 
the prospects of its export-led model of development (and in competing, in particular, 
with China in exporting manufactured goods).  
 
 
 
 
C. Least Developed Countries 
General Summary 
This research has conducted four case studies of Least Developed Countries. They 
include Senegal and Uganda in sub-Saharan Africa and Bhutan and Nepal in South Asia. 
All four countries have been relatively successful in promoting economic development in 
recent decades. During the 2000s Bhutan was the fastest growing economy among the 
four: its GDP grew, on average, by 8.4%. Bhutan was followed by Uganda, which grew 
by 7.2%. However, the economies of Nepal and Senegal grew much more slowly, at 
4.2% and 3.9%, respectively. 
Though Uganda grew relatively fast, its record on expanding quality employment was the 
least successful among the four countries. Between the 1990s and the 2000s, it managed 
to increase the share of the employed earning $2 per day or more by 14.6 percentage 
points. But 8.5 percentage points, or about 58% of this total, remained ‘near-poor’ 
employed (earning only $2 to $4 per day).  
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Senegal expanded the ranks of its total ‘non-poor’ employed (those earning more than $2 
per day) by 16.3 percentage points. Of this total, however, 10.5 percentage points, or 
about 64%, remained ‘near-poor’ employed. Nepal achieved a sizeable absolute increase 
in its total ‘non-poor’ employed, i.e. 18.8 percentage points. But about 73% of this 
increase remained, however, as ‘near-poor’ employed. So, though there was progress in 
improving employment in these LDCs, many of the employed remained vulnerable to 
falling back into poverty. 
Bhutan made the most progress on improving the quality of its employment. The share of 
its non-poor employed almost doubled, from 32% to 58%, between the two decades. 
While there was a 14 percentage point increase in the ‘near poor’ (earning $2 – 4 per day), 
Bhutan still managed to increase the size of the ‘developing middle class’ (those who 
earn $4 – 13 per day) by 13 percentage points.  
With the exception of Bhutan, the other three LDCs have not had above-average levels of 
government revenue. Senegal’s average revenue during the 2000s, at about 21% of GDP, 
was the highest among these three. Uganda averaged only about 18% while Nepal 
averaged only about 14%. The average for all LDCs during the 2000s was 23.5%. In 
stark contrast, Bhutan had, by far, the highest government revenue, at 35% of GDP, 
during the 2000s. But, in general, it seems clear that most LDCs lack the ‘fiscal space’ to 
carry out public investment projects that would promote economic development. 
All four of these LDCs received substantial amounts of Official Development Assistance, 
ranging from about 6% of GNI to about 14%. So, with the exception of Bhutan, these 
countries generated very little domestic revenue. The lack of adequate fiscal space 
remains a serious constraint on the development of most LDCs. 
And, despite receiving ODA, these LDCs still suffered from fiscal deficits, ranging from 
-1.1% of GDP to -3.3%. As a result, their government debt as a ratio to GDP ranged from 
about 45% to about 68%. Servicing such sizeable debt burdens still consumed a 
significant share of their domestic revenue as well as the ODA that they received. Hence, 
despite their successes, these countries remained severely fiscally constrained during the 
2000s. 
Monetary policies appeared to have significantly contained inflationary pressures in these 
four countries. Their average inflation rates during the 2000s ranged only between 2.1% 
(for Senegal) to 7.3% (for Uganda). Senegal’s consumer price inflation was remarkably 
low but appeared to be based on relatively low growth in its broad money. Hence, it was 
clearly implemented fairly restrictive monetary policies, which could have placed undue 
constraints on its economic growth. 
Yet the real interest rate in this small sample of countries varied significantly: it seemed 
too high in Uganda (over 14%) and too low in Nepal (a mere 0.4%). Not surprisingly, 
domestic credit as a ratio to GDP appeared to be too high in Nepal (i.e., about 52%) and 
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too low in Uganda (only about 12%). Undoubtedly, the financial sector in all four of 
these economies was decidedly weak and underdeveloped. And few of these governments 
had the capacity necessary to effectively regulate these sectors. 
However, thanks in part to international debt relief initiatives, such as HIPC, three of 
these LDCs had faced external debt stocks during the 2000s that were only 46% of GNI 
or less. The one exception was Bhutan, which did not benefit from HIPC. Thus, it still 
shouldered an external debt of 72% of GNI. This debt was due, however, to large 
infrastructure projects, which were helping to modernize its economy. Not surprisingly, 
very little hot money flowed into these four countries: the share of each country’s short-
term debt in total external debt was miniscule in all cases. 
One of the greatest weaknesses of these LDCs was the very large trade deficits that they 
continually generated. Their trade deficits averaged between -19% of GDP (for Bhutan) 
and -12.5% of GDP for Uganda. But, while Bhutan, Senegal and Uganda also suffered 
from significant current-account deficits, Nepal did succeed in generating a small average 
surplus of 2.6% of GDP during the 2000s, due in part to a significant inflow of 
remittances.  
Where these four LDCs appeared to do relatively well was in their record on total 
investment. Uganda averaged total investment of about 22% of GDP during the 2000s 
(which was close to the LDC average). And both Nepal and Senegal averaged total 
investment over 25% of GDP. But, extraordinarily, Bhutan’s total investment was over 
50% during the 2000s (thanks to the large infrastructure projects already mentioned 
above). 
Not surprisingly, however, the achievements of these four LDCs on investment in social 
and economic infrastructure varied significantly. Bhutan achieved an average secondary 
school enrolment ratio of 54% and Nepal 41% during the 2000s. But Senegal and Uganda 
achieved enrolment ratios in the range of only 21-26%.  
But only Senegal recorded average Kilowat hours of electricity per capita that 
approximated the LDC average of a mere 146 kWh. Investments in social and economic 
infrastructure have been areas of particularly weak development in all LDCs. For 
example, during the 2000s, the average enrolment ratios of all LDCs were only about half 
the level of LMIs and their average electricity generation only about 17% of the LMI 
level. 
Bhutan 
Bhutan is a Least Developed Country that has had a very impressive growth and 
employment record for the past two decades. This small South Asian economy managed 
to accelerate its growth rate from a strong 5.3% during the 1990s to beyond 8% during 
the 2000s.  
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Also, growth appeared to have benefitted a broad segment of the employed. The share of 
the non-poor employed almost doubled from 32% to 60% between the two decades. The 
strongest gain, 14 percentage points, was among the ‘near poor’ (earning $2 – 4 per day), 
followed by a 13 percentage-point gain among ‘the developing middle class’ (those who 
earn $4 – 13 per day).  
However, these gains did not coincide with an increase in the share of wage employment. 
This share declined, in fact, by about 4 percentage points. At the same time, the share of 
vulnerable employment increased by similar percentage points.  
Bhutan’s general government revenue as a share of GDP was close to 40% during the 
1990s, a level far beyond the average for Least Developed Countries (21%). 
Simultaneously, Official Development Assistance received by the country was also 
extraordinarily high, i.e., 23% of GNI.  
But ODA declined significantly during the 2000s, to less than 11% of GNI. At the same 
time, government revenue decreased to 36% of GDP. [Why???] Moreover, the overall 
fiscal stance of the country deteriorated: its fiscal deficit enlarged to -3.1% of GDP and, 
most worryingly, its government debt ballooned to almost 68% of GDP. The country’s 
deteriorating fiscal position can be explained by the large infrastructure investment it has 
been undertaking. Half of Bhutan’s debt is concentrated in commercially viable 
hydropower projects, mitigating a potential risk of debt distress.  
There were contradictory trends in Bhutan’s monetary performance between the 1990s 
and 2000s. Consumer price 
inflation dipped to about 5% while 
the growth of broad money 
declined to about 17%. But the 
real rate of interest rose from 6% 
to 9%. Such a trend in the real 
interest rate was common among 
LDCs. By the 2000s their average 
real rate of interest was 9.5%. But 
this trend indicated that their 
financial sectors were not 
providing enough credit at 
affordable rates.  
 
Consistent with this concern, 
domestic credit provided by 
Bhutan’s banking system 
increased to only 18% of GDP, on 
BHUTAN 1990s 2000s
GDP 5.3 8.4
Employment indicators
All non-poor (USD 2-13+, PPP) 31.6 59.5
Near poor (USD 2-4, PPP) 19.9 34.1
Developing middle class (USD 4-13, PPP) 9.2 22.9
Middle class and above (USD 13+, PPP) 2.5 2.5
Wage employment 33.9 29.6
Vulnerable employment 65.8 70.2
Fiscal indicators
General government revenue 37.6 35.9
ODA 23.0 10.6
Fiscal balance -0.3 -3.1
Gross government debt 44.0 67.6
Monetary indicators
Inflation 9.9 5.4
Broad money growth 24.9 17.3
Real interest rate 6.3 9.2
Financial indicators
Domestic credit 7.3 18.4
External debt stock 38.2 72.1
Short-term debt 1.2 0.9
Exchange rate indicators
Current account -3.1 -10.6
Trade balance -12.5 -18.8
International reserves 48.3 61.3
Development indicators
Total investment 39.6 50.9
Secondary school enrolment 34.9 53.8
Electricity consumption n/a n/a
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average, during the 2000s. This has recently changed as credit expansion picked up 
strongly during the mid-2000s, reaching 36% of GDP during the late 2000s. The quick 
pace of private credit extension requires close monitoring to prevent a build-up of 
financial fragility. Meanwhile, the country’s external debt almost doubled between the 
1990s and 2000s, reaching the alarming level of about 72% of GNI. There was little 
comfort, however, in the fact that less than 1% of this debt was short-term in nature. 
Bhutan’s external position deteriorated dramatically between the 1990s and 2000s. This 
was due during the 2000s to large hydropower-related imports. The country’s average 
trade deficit was almost -19% of GDP and its current-account deficit was close to -11%. 
Given Indian loan disbursements associated with the hydropower projects, Bhutan was 
able to amass a large stockpile of international reserves. They averaged about 61% of 
GDP during the 2000s. This build-up was due, in part, to a large inflow of remittances. 
Despite a deteriorating macroeconomic performance that has been reflected in key fiscal, 
monetary, financial and external-account outcomes, Bhutan has still managed to boost its 
total investment from an already high level of almost 40% of GDP during the 1990s to 
almost 51% during the 2000s.[We have to explain this anomaly] Though there are no 
data on electricity consumption, Bhutan was able to significantly increase its gross 
secondary school enrolment ratio from about 35% during the 1990s to about 54% during 
the 2000s. 
Nepal 
While Nepal’s GDP grew strongly over the 1990s, at a rate of almost 5% on average, this 
rate slowed to 4.2% during the 2000s. Nevertheless, the share of the non-poor employed 
increased substantially, from over 13% of the total during the 1990s to about 34% during 
the 2000s.  
However, only about 6 percentage points of the 20 percentage-point increase in the non-
poor employed were due to increases in the employed earning more than $4 per day. 
Two-thirds of the increase in the non-poor employed was attributable, in fact, to 
substantial increases in the ‘near-poor’ employed (who earned only $2-4 per day). 
During the 2000s, Nepal still suffered from a lack of ‘fiscal space’ to carry out 
development efforts. General government revenue as a ratio to GDP was only about 14% 
during the 2000s, while ODA represented almost 6% of GNI.  Thanks, in part, to ODA, 
the government ran only an average deficit of -1.1% of GDP during the 2000s. In 
addition, its government debt as a ratio to GDP stood at about 49%, a relatively low level 
for a Least Developed Country. 
The government of Nepal has managed to improve some of its monetary indicators. The 
rate of consumer price inflation dropped from an average of close to 10% during the 
1990s to just above 6% during the 2000s. At the same time, the growth of broad money 
declined marginally, from about 19.5% to 17%.  
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However, the real interest rate, which was already relatively low during the 1990s, 
plummeted to an average of only 0.4% during the 2000s. This is an incredibly low level 
for an LDC, where real interest rates were close to 10% on average during the 2000s. Not 
surprisingly, domestic credit provided by the banking system expanded rapidly, from 
about 32% of GDP during the 1990s to over 50% during the 2000s.  Such a level could 
be a source of financial instability in Nepal. 
 
NEPAL 1990s 2000s
GDP 4.9 4.2
Employment indicators
All non-poor (USD 2-13+, PPP) 13.4 33.5
Near poor (USD 2-4, PPP) 11.4 25.2
Developing middle class (USD 4-13, PPP) 1.8 7.4
Middle class and above (USD 13+, PPP) 0.1 0.9
Wage employment 21.4 24.5
Vulnerable employment 75.4 71.5
Fiscal indicators
General government revenue n/a 14.2
ODA 9.8 5.9
Fiscal balance n/a -1.1
Gross government debt n/a 48.9
Monetary indicators
Inflation 9.8 6.2
Broad money growth 19.5 17.0
Real interest rate 5.3 0.4
Financial indicators
Domestic credit 31.9 50.4
External debt stock 52.5 38.1
Short-term debt 1.3 1.5
Exchange rate indicators
Current account -3.7 2.6
Trade balance -10.8 -18.1
International reserves 13.9 19.2
Development indicators
Total investment 22.7 25.0
Secondary school enrolment 37.4 41.2
Electricity consumption 44.9 80.3  
 
However, Nepal did manage to significantly reduce its external debt stock between the 
1990s and 2000s, namely, from 52.5% to about 38% of GNI (without having benefitted 
from the HIPC initiative). Moreover, short-term debt continued to play an insignificant 
role in Nepal’s total external debt during the 2000s.  
Nepal’s trade position has been decisively shaped by its links to the economy of India. 
Dominated by trade with India, Nepal’s trade deficit ballooned from almost -11% of GDP 
during the 1990s to about -18% during the 2000s.  
However, the country’s current account recovered from a deficit of -3.7% of GDP during 
the 1990s to a surplus of 2.6% during the 2000s. Nepal receives significant inflows of 
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both ODA and remittances (with personal remittances averaging about 15% of GDP 
during the 2000s). As a result, it has managed to increase its holdings of international 
reserves from 14% of GDP to almost 20%.   
During the 2000s, Nepal’s investment efforts accelerated, reaching 25% of GDP, a 
threshold often regarded as necessary to achieve sustainable growth and economic 
development. Nepal’s average level was well above the LDC average of only 21.6% of 
GDP.  
However, Nepal made only marginal progress in raising its secondary school enrolment 
ratio, which edged up from 37% during the 1990s to only 41% during the 2000s—even 
though Nepal’s resultant level was above the average for all LDCs. Average electricity 
consumption per capita did increase in Nepal between the 1990s and 2000s. But the 
initial average level in the 1990s was incredibly low, at only 45 kWh. Nepal’s success in 
boosting this average to 80 kWh still meant that its electricity consumption lagged well 
behind the average even for LDCs (i.e., about 146 kWh). 
In some respects, Nepal has done remarkably well, especially given its LDC status. It has 
managed to grow at decent rates and expand the ranks of its non-poor employed. It does 
continue to suffer from a lack of government revenue but its overall investment 
performance has been superior. However, concretely, investments in both social and 
economic infrastructure continue to lag behind the country’s considerable needs for 
improvement.  
Nepal has made significant progress, overall, on improving its fiscal and monetary 
conditions. But its financial conditions remain problematic, based on incredibly low real 
rates of interest and the excessive expansion of domestic credit. Nepal has improved its 
current-account position between the 1990s and 2000s, despite the daunting size of its 
trade deficits. But this condition has made the country heavily reliant on net transfers, 
such as ODA and remittances. 
Senegal  
Senegal had only moderate rates of economic growth during the 1990s and 2000s. Its 
growth of GDP was only 2.7% during the 1990s and reached 3.9% during the 2000s. 
Partly as a result, between the 1990s and 2000s it was only able to expand the share of 
wage employment in total employment by a little less than 5 percentage points. In a 
similar fashion, it succeeded in reducing vulnerable employment by only about 5 
percentage points. But the latter category still comprised over three-quarters of all 
employment in Senegal. 
However, Senegal did succeed in enlarging the share of the ‘non-poor’ employed by over 
16 percentage points, so that it reached 36% of all the employed. However, about two-
thirds of this total increase (i.e., 10.5 percentage points) represented an expansion in the 
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‘near-poor’ employed (earning only $2-4 per day). There was only a 5.5 percentage 
increase in the employed who earned $4-13 (the so-called ‘developing middle class’). 
There are limited data on fiscal indicators for Senegal in the 1990s. But what the data for 
the 2000s show is that general government revenue in Senegal, standing at less than 21% 
of GDP, was below-average even for LDCs. At the same time, Senegal was receiving 
sizeable contributions of ODA, which were worth 8.6% of GNI on average. Yet the 
government still ran an average fiscal deficit of -3.3% of GDP during the 2000s, due 
partly to increased expenditure on infrastructure projects.  
However, thankfully the general government debt still averaged only 45% of GDP. This 
level was quite low compared to the LDC average of about 86%. 
 
SENEGAL 1990s 2000s
GDP 2.7 3.9
Employment indicators
All non-poor (USD 2-13+, PPP) 19.2 36.0
Near poor (USD 2-4, PPP) 14.6 25.1
Developing middle class (USD 4-13, PPP) 4.3 9.8
Middle class and above (USD 13+, PPP) 0.3 1.1
Wage employment 18.9 23.7
Vulnerable employment 80.5 75.7
Fiscal indicators
General government revenue n/a 20.9
ODA 11.9 8.6
Fiscal balance n/a -3.3
Gross government debt n/a 45.0
Monetary indicators
Inflation 4.4 2.1
Broad money growth 7.5 12.0
Real interest rate 16.9 n/a
Financial indicators
Domestic credit 26.1 24.3
External debt stock 76.8 46.0
Short-term debt 7.9 3.9
Exchange rate indicators
Current account -5.9 -7.8
Trade balance -6.9 -15.3
International reserves 4.1 13.6
Development indicators
Total investment 12.5 25.3
Secondary school enrolment 15.4 25.8
Electricity consumption 110.5 151.3  
 
It appears that the Government of Senegal was committed to trying to achieve low rates 
of inflation. Between the 1990s and 2000s, it succeeded in reducing the rate of consumer 
price inflation from the already low level of 4.4% to a mere 2.1%. This represented an 
unusually low level of inflation for an LDC.  
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Corresponding to this low level of inflation during the 2000s was a relatively slow 
growth of broad money, i.e., only 12%. Hence, monetary policies in Senegal during this 
period were unusually tight and could have contributed to slowing its rate of economic 
growth. 
Data on the real rate of interest for the 2000s are lacking but this rate was quite high, at 
about 17% on average, during the 1990s. It appears that such a high cost of borrowing 
carried over, to some degree, into the 2000s since the provision of domestic credit by the 
banking system represented only about 24% of GDP, down from the 1990s’ average of 
about 26%. 
However, Senegal did benefit from joining the HIPC initiative. Its external debt stock 
declined, as a result, from an average of almost 77% of GNI during the 1990s to 46% 
during the 2000s. At the same time, Senegal was able to reduce the share of short-term 
debt in its total external debt. This share declined from about 8% to only about 4%. 
Like many other LDCs, Senegal has suffered chronically from running large trade and 
current-account deficits. The country’s trade deficit more than doubled between the 
1990s and 2000s, i.e., from -6.9% of GDP to -15.3%. Over the same time period, 
Senegal’s current account deficit worsened from -5.9% of GDP to -7.8%.  
However, Senegal did manage to more than triple its international reserves, from about 
4% of GDP to 13.6%. Such a stockpile will give its central bank some limited control 
over the value of its exchange rate. 
One of the most striking features about Senegal’s recent economic progress has been the 
rapid rise in its total investments. As a ratio to GDP, total investment soared from an 
average of only 12.5% during the 1990s to an average of over 25% during the 2000s. 
Rising investment levels were led by government infrastructure investment, accounting 
for just over one third of capital expenditure in recent years (IMF Article IV 2012). These 
investment efforts attracted, in turn, substantial private-sector investment, resulting in 
overall investment levels that were higher than the average even for Emerging 
Economies. 
In the absence of countervailing factors (such as the drag produced by a large trade 
deficit), one would expect such levels of investment to accelerate economic growth. 
Economic growth did accelerate, but only to 3.9% per year, on average during the 2000s. 
Such investment should have enabled Senegal to substantially improve its social and 
economic infrastructure. The country did succeed in raising its gross secondary school 
enrolment ratio from 15.4% during the 1990s to almost 26% during the 2000s. But this 
resultant level still stood below the overall LDC average of about 33%.  
Senegal did manage to increase its average electricity consumption from the very low 
level of 110 kWh during the 1990s to about 150 kWh during the 2000s, with the latter 
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level corresponding roughly to the LDC average. But this LDC average is exceptionally 
low, especially when it is compared to the LMI average of about 940 kWh. 
In summary, Senegal was moderately successful in accelerating its economic growth and 
expanding ‘non-poor’ employment during the 2000s. It was also a prime beneficiary of 
international debt relief during this period. Yet its government revenue has remained low, 
it still relies heavily on ODA and it still runs fiscal deficits. 
The government has certainly tightened up on its monetary policies, driving the inflation 
rate to a mere 2% average during the 2000s. But the financial sector appears to have 
benefitted very little since domestic credit remains relatively scarce (a condition that 
Senegal shares with most LDCs). 
Senegal is noteworthy for having dramatically boosted its total investment rate, namely, 
to over 25% of GDP during the 2000s. But there have not yet been radical improvements 
in investment in social and economic infrastructure. And its total investment has not yet 
translated into substantially expanding its exports in order to overcome its chronic trade 
and current-account deficits.  
Uganda 
Uganda grew strongly throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The growth of GDP accelerated, 
in fact, from 6.4% during the 1990s to 7.2% during the 2000s. However, in the wake of 
the Global Financial Crisis, its growth rate slowed somewhat, back to 6%. 
Though starting from a very low base, Uganda was able to expand quality employment 
over the course of both decades.  The share of wage employment did increase from about 
9% to a little over 16%. And vulnerable employment declined from the very high share of 
91% to less than 84%. 
Uganda was also able to increase the share of the ‘non-poor’ employed by 16 percentage 
points between the 1990s and 2000s. But the resultant share was still below 30%. In 
addition, more than half of the new ‘non-poor’ employed were still earning only ‘near-
poor’ income (only $2-4 per day). 
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UGANDA 1990s 2000s
GDP 6.4 7.2
Employment indicators
All non-poor (USD 2-13+, PPP) 13.7 29.4
Near poor (USD 2-4, PPP) 12.8 21.3
Developing middle class (USD 4-13, PPP) 0.8 7.2
Middle class and above (USD 13+, PPP) 0.1 0.8
Wage employment 8.9 16.1
Vulnerable employment 91.0 83.6
Fiscal indicators
General government revenue 17.6 17.9
ODA 15.9 13.9
Fiscal balance -2.3 -2.9
Gross government debt 73.3 60.3
Monetary indicators
Inflation 19.1 7.3
Broad money growth 36.1 19.3
Real interest rate 11.2 13.2
Financial indicators
Domestic credit 8.8 11.2
External debt stock 74.4 39.8
Short-term debt 4.1 7.3
Exchange rate indicators
Current account -5.8 -5.3
Trade balance -13.6 -12.5
International reserves 6.9 16.6
Development indicators
Total investment 16.1 21.7
Secondary school enrolment 10.3 21.1
Electricity consumption n/a n/a  
 
During the 1990s and 2000s, Uganda was not able to translate its stellar record of 
economic growth into commensurate increases in government revenue. In fact, revenue 
as a ratio to GDP stagnated at just below 18% (well below the LDC average of 23.5%). 
At the same time, Uganda was receiving very large amounts of Official Development 
Assistance, worth 14-16% of GNI. 
Despite such levels of ODA, the government continued running fiscal deficits, which 
edged up from an average of -2.3% of GDP in the 1990s to -2.9% in the 2000s. 
Government debt also remained worryingly high though it declined from an average of 
about 73% of GDP during the 1990s to an average of about 60%.  
Monetary policy was successful in reducing consumer price inflation from close to 20% 
on average during the 1990s to 7.3% during the 2000s. Correspondingly, the growth of 
broad money slowed from a rate of 36% to 19%. However, despite such trends, the real 
rate of interest remained high. In fact, it edged up from an average of just above 11% 
during the 1990s to slightly more than 13% during the 2000s. 
Such a high real rate of interest has dampened the extension of credit for productive 
investment. Domestic credit provided by banks was a mere 8.8% of GDP during the 
1990s and it expanded to only a little over 11% by the 2000s. This level for the 2000s 
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was less than half the LDC average. This severe lack of credit poses a major obstacle to 
expanding private investment in Uganda. 
Uganda has benefitted appreciably from debt relief provided by the HIPC Initiative. As a 
result of such efforts, its external debt declined from over 74% of GNI during the 2000s 
to less than 40% during the 2000s. At the same time, there was only a marginal increase 
in the share of its short-term in total external debt, i.e., from about 4% to about 7%. 
Like many LDCs, Uganda has continued to suffer from fairly large trade and current-
account deficits during the 1990s and 2000s. Its trade deficit declined only slightly 
between the 1990s and 2000s, from -13.6% of GDP to -12.5%. Meanwhile, its current-
account deficit edged down only from -5.8% of GDP to -5.3%. 
Nevertheless, Uganda has managed to expand its holdings of international reserves. 
These more than doubled between the 1990s and 2000s, from close to 7% of GDP to over 
16%. The percentage for the 2000s was close to the average for all LDCs. 
Despite high real rates of interest, Uganda has boosted its total investment, as a ratio to 
GDP, from about 15% during the 1990s to about 21% during the 2000s. Its level during 
the 2000s was about average for an LDC.  
Unfortunately, there are no data on Uganda’s average electricity consumption. However, 
data for its gross secondary school enrolment ratio suggest that it has made only modest 
progress between the 1990s and 2000s. Starting from a very low ratio of about 10% 
during the 1990, Uganda’s ratio increased to only about 21% during the 2000s. This 
attainment was well below the average for all LDCs of 33%. 
In summary, Uganda has made notable progress on achieving relatively high rates of 
economic growth and beginning to expand productive employment from a very low 
initial level. But it has not managed to translate its growth success into a stronger fiscal 
position, particularly by boosting government revenue.  
Thankfully, Uganda has benefitted from substantial international debt relief and this has 
eased, to some degree, the fiscal pressures. But its domestic economy remains starved of 
credit. Though it has managed to reduce inflation, its average real rate of interest has 
stayed stubbornly high. 
Uganda continues to put itself in a disadvantaged position internationally by consistently 
running substantial deficits on both its trade account and current account. Were the 
current sizeable inflows of Official Development Assistance to diminish significantly, 
Uganda would be in a particularly vulnerable position. 
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